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Six years ago we considered a number · of similarities and
differences in the criminal justice systems of Australia and the United
States. 1 Our investigation found that the regulatory framework for
criminal procedure is similar in both systems, and that both systems
promote the presumption of innocence and impose requirements
designed to ensure the voluntariness of confessions. 2 Still, each system
approaches some key matters on very different bases. These include the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the right to counsel, the
transparency of jury deliberations, and the issue of entrapment in
criminal investigation. 3 In our view, U.S. jurisprudence is "rightsoriented," while Australian jurisprudence is "official-centric.'"' Without a
constitutional basis for rights development and a proclivity for
jurisprudence designed to protect the integrity of the courts and their
processes rather than individual rights, Australian courts are far less
likely than their U.S. counterparts to exclude illegally obtained evidence
and confessions, to limit evidence (or dismiss charges) obtained by way
of entrapment, or to open trials to public scrutiny.
However, we did not simply point out the constitutional differences
between our two countries as an explanation for the different paths taken.
We offered the thesis that the embedding of rights in the United States
Constitution and the subsequent development of rights-based
jurisprudence governing criminal investigation and process-some of
which, like the doctrine of entrapment, are wholly independent of
l.
See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common
Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TuL. J.INT'L & CaMP. L. 27 (2004).
2.
See id at 28.
3.
Seeidatll4-l6.
4.
/datll4.
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constitutional rights-sprang from a different history and culture than
that which developed in Australia post-British colonization. 5 The
Framers of the Australian Constitution drafted in the late 1890s
deliberately rejected embedding rights out of the belief that the English
system of responsible government was a sufficient assurance of civil
liberty. 6 They thought that the imposition of rights would only benefit
alien elements in Australian society. By contrast, in the United States,
the revolutionary context in which the Constitution was formed resulted
in a compact between the State and the people with a full articulation of
rights, lest the State should use its power to ride roughshod over
individual liberties. 7 In other words, it was the divergent cultures of
colonization and revolution, and reliance upon state beneficence versus
fear of state tyranny, which led to our constitutional differences and
contrasting approaches to criminal justice.
The purpose of this Article is to investigate other areas of criminal
justice and to consider whether our thesis continues to operate as an
explanation for the different approaches taken in each jurisdiction. This
Article will examine four key aspects of criminal justice in the two
nations: prosecutorial discretion, especially in charging and plea
bargaining; double jeopardy; sentencing; and alternatives to incarceration
as punishment.
The investigation is timely for a number of reasons. First, following
a change of government in 2007, Australia embarked upon a consultation
process to examine whether Australia should have a Bill of Rights. A
National Human Rights Consultation Committee was formed to convene
a series of community roundtables, to develop submissions, and to
deliver a report that is currently being considered by the Australian
governmene Since our first article one Australian state, Victoria, and the
Australian Capital Territory, Canberra, have already enacted legislation
designed to protect and promote human rights. 9 The rights set out in
these statutes do not endorse the adoption of the United States' approach
to evidence obtained illegally, entrapment, and so on; moreover, the rights
Id at 116.
Id
Id at 100.
8.
See AUSTRALIA NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION COMMIITEE, NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION REPORT (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsconsultation.
gov.au (follow "Report" hyperlink). The committee is headed by Jesuit cleric and law professor
Frank Brennan. See Australia National Hwnan Rights Consultation Committee, Father Frank
Brennan AO, http://www.hwnanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.ns17Page!Who_Father
Frank:BrennanAO-Chair (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
9.
Charter ofHwnan Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006 (Viet. Acts); Hwnan Rights
Act, 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr. Laws).
5.
6.
7.
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themselves are subject to limitation and qualification. Nevertheless, the
fact of their articulation suggests that Australia's idiosyncratic position
apropos of civil liberties in the common law world is undergoing change,
albeit slow and incremental.
The second development worth noting since our original article was
published is a series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court
raising questions about the reach of the exclusionary rule, something we
saw earlier as a fundamental difference between the two systems. Two of
the decisions give grave concern about the direction of U.S. law and the
exclusionary rule, while two others follow a much more rights-based
approach.
The first case is Herring v. Umted States. 10 In a split decision, the
Court relaxed the application of the exclusionary rule regarding search
and seizure without a valid warrant.n The police officers who found
drugs and firearms had acted on the basis of inaccurate information
concerning the existence of an outstanding warrant included in a
neighboring county database. 12 Although the majority Justices accepted
that there had been a Fourth Amendment violation, they characterized the
error as a matter of "isolated negligence" rather than systematic error or
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements. 13 Releasing the
defendant on such a minor violation, while the police were in possession
of a warrant, seriously undermined the criminal justice system. 14
In Hudson v. Michigan, 15 too, the United States Supreme Court was
far more willing to limit the use of the exclusionary rule to head off
police misconduct. The Justices there held that a violation of the "knockand-announce" rule 16 does not require suppression of evidence found in a
search in which an otherwise valid warrant was improperly executed. 17
Focusing on the key rationale for the exclusionary rule-deterrence-the
Court determined that suppression would not serve the interest protected
by the constitutional guarantee against unannounced entry. 18 Though the
knock-and-announce rule protected property and privacy, for the
10. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
11. Id at 702-03.
12. Id at 698.
13. Id (reasoning that when the error was due to such "isolated negligence;' the benefits
of deterring police misconduct by excluding illegally obtained evidence were clearly outweighed
by the substantial social cost of allowing the defendant to go free).
14. Id at 704.
15. 547 u.s. 586 (2006).
16. The basic principle was first announced in Uilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,931-32
(1995).
17. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
18. Id

2010]

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

339

majority this interest did not outweigh the social costs of excluding
relevant incriminating evidence when the police were acting pursuant to
a legitimate warrant.' 9
The direction of the United States Supreme Court as to a rightsbased criminal justice system becomes much less clear when one views
its most recent pronouncements in the area. The so-called McNabbMallory rule, 20 developed in the 1940s and 50s, requires an arrested
person to be brought before a judicial officer "without unnecessary
delay."21 If the rule is not satisfied, any statement obtained from the
accused during the delay must be suppressed. 22 The holdings were
actually based upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-not the
Constitution-which were seemingly changed by Congress in a
legislative enactment in 2006.23 The Court in both McNabb and Mallory
was careful to note that it was implying the sanction from the purpose of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the impact of the
subsequent changes to the federal statute was unclear until the Court's
decision in Corley v. United States. 24 In that case, the five-Justice
majority held that if the suspect was not brought before a magistrate
within the six-hour time period specified-unless there was an
emergency-any resulting confession would be inadmissible. 25
The other case to raise questions about whether the United States
Supreme Court truly intends to step back from its strong support for a
mandatory exclusionary rule is Aniona v. Gane6 After the defendant
had stepped out of his car, officers arrested and handcuffed him. 27 They
19.
entries).
20.
Mallory v.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Jd at 599 (stating that "massive deterrence" was not necessary against unannounced

So named for the cases of McNabb v. Um"ted States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 452.
Jd at 453.
Jd at 452-53; see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (2006).
129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
Jd at 1571. The language here is quite strong, and reaffirming of an earlier period:
In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free to question
suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in the open, and we have
always known what custodial secrecy leads to. . . . No one with any smattering of the
history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand
the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. "[C]ustodial
police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual," ... and
there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly
high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.
Id at 1570 (citations omitted).
26.
129AS.Ct.1710, 1714(2009).
27. /dat1715.
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then searched the car and found drugs. 28 The trial court justified the
arrest under a well-established doctrine that allows for a search of the
defendant and the area under his immediate control at the time of the
arrese9 The majority affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's reversal of
Gant's conviction, ruling the search invalid. 30 They found that the "search
incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or a valid
suspicion of evidence in the vehicle. 31 Because the defendant had left the
vehicle before the police went into it, the search of the vehicle was not
directly connected to the arrest and, without that justification, violated
the Constitution. 32
By tempering the application of the exclusionary rule according to
the degree of police culpability involved and tying this to the integrity of
the criminal justice system, the decisions in Hening and Hudson appear
far more analogous to the Australian official-centric jurisprudence
examined in our original article than was previously observed. Yet, the
Supreme Court's recent Corley and Gant rulings seemingly return the
Americans to a more traditional view of individual rights and deterrence
of overzealous law enforcement.
The question for us here is whether the various recent developments
in our respective nations signal substantive shifts away from the views we
expressed in our first article. We do not think that they do. We turn now
to four distinct, yet related, areas in an attempt to shed light on this
subject.
II.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

A.

The United States

The great reach of prosecutorial discretion is seen most prominently
in the plea bargaining process. 33 The American criminal justice system
28. Id
29. Id (relying on the doctrine of a "search incident to arrest"). The major case involving
this doctrine is Chime] v. Califomia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
30.
Gan~ 129A S. Ct. at 1719.
31. Id
32. Id Relying on its well-established case law, the Court held as follows:
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after
the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle [unless,
because of] circumstances unique to the automobile context . . . it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
Id at 1714.
33. Though, certainly, the impact of great prosecutorial discretion is not limited to this
area. The American prosecutor, for instance, retains tremendous power regarding pretrial
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has become a process of negotiations more than a guaranteed trial by
jury. 34 Today, plea bargaining disposes of more than 90% of criminal
cases before a jury panel is even selected. 35 Plea bargaining is the
process by which the lawyer for an accused criminal defendant and the
prosecutor negotiate a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case,
which is subject to the approval of the court holding jurisdiction over the
matter. Such a deal prevents both parties from going to trial. Plea
bargaining has evolved from an accepted, though limited, alternative to
trial by a jury of one's peers to the primary and favored method of
disposing criminal cases in the United States. It continues to be hotly
debated.
Proponents of plea bargains argue that there are benefits for all
participants in the system:
prosecutors, defendants, and judges.
Prosecutors must allocate their finite resources over an ever-expanding
criminal docket. With the benefit of pleas, government attorneys are
given the option of summarily disposing of cases that are less serious,
allowing them to concentrate their efforts on graver issues that may
discovery. See Symposium, Prosecuton"al Discretion, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 367 (2009)
(reviewing many aspects ofprosecutorial discretion).
34. See Sara Sun Beale, Introduction to Symposium, supra note 33, at 367. The Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST.
amend VI.
35. Felony Sentences in State CoUJts, 2004, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Washington, D.C.), July 2007, at I; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2001, at 2 (2003) ("The proportion of
convicted defendants who pleaded guilty increased from 87% during 1990 to 95% during
2001."); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF
CONVICTED FELONS, 2000, tbl.4.2 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sc0001st.pdf
(finding 95% of felony convictions in state courts were achieved through guilty pleas); BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs2002, at 455 tb1.5.57 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastor eds., 30th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sb2002/sb2002.zip (detailing the system in seventy-five
counties). Americans are quite familiar with the plea bargaining process, which has been used by
numerous high profile defendants such as:
Actor Mel Gibson-driving under the influence; three years' probation and ordered to attend
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings for a year.
Musician Richie Sambora-two counts ofDUl; three years' probation and must attend firstoffender alcohol awareness class for three months.
Singer Boy George-false reporting of an incident and drug charge; agreed to enter a drug
rehabilitation program and perform community service.
Football player Michael Vick---dog fighting conspiracy; twenty-three months in prison.
Football player Plaxico Burress-possession of a weapon; two year prison sentence.
Financier Bernard Madoff-multiple counts of unlawful stock trading; 150 years in prison.
Rapper T.I. (Clifford Joseph Harris, Sr.)---attempting to buy unregistered weapons; a year
and a day imprisonment and $100,000 in fmes.
Football player Donte Stallworth-manslaughter (killing pedestrian while driving under the
influence); thirty day jail sentence.
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require the strictest attention and the verdict of a jury for maximum
penalties. 36 Criminal defendants also derive an obvious benefit. In
exchange for pleading guilty, the defendant avoids a trial and can receive
sentence-related concessions from the prosecutor or the dismissal of
some of the charges in the indictment. Finally, judges benefit by having
the docket relieved of matters that would otherwise require the resources
of the court. Plea bargains allow the judiciary to administer justice more
diligently and efficiently by reducing the caseload of the courts and
allowing judges more time to attend to fewer·cases. Quick disposition of
cases through pleas reduces the expense of providing jury trials.
The arguments in the opposing camp illustrate the potential dangers
presented by plea bargaining. Critics assert that bargaining facilitates
numerous subversions of the criminal justice system. For some, it is
unconscionable that "criminals benefit from bargaining with the state
and avoid what may be [the more] appropriate," and more harsh,
sanctions for their crimes. 37 For example, a defendant who clearly
committed an assault with a deadly weapon may negotiate with a
prosecutor, agreeing to plead guilty to simple assault (with no mention of
a deadly weapon), in exchange for forgoing a trial on the more severe
crime. The criminal may well deserve a stem punishment for the crime
of which he is truly guilty, but because of plea bargaining he will receive
a lesser punishment for a lesser crime. 38
Other critics view the concerns from a very different perspective.
They fear that constitutionally guaranteed safeguards against government
oppression are circumvented. "[T]he Constitution and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of it provide ... explicit rules for the determination
of guilt and the establishment of punishment."39 Plea bargaining eludes
these stringent due process requirements and the proof required for
36. Of course, prosecutors may also engage in bargaining for other reasons: "to hedge
against the risk of acquittal; to preserve scarce resources; to protect victims; and to show
sympathy for the defendant." John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial
Discretion: The Role ofthe Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 639, 64142 (2008).
37.
See, e.g., Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should ~ Really "Ban" Plea
Bargaining?: The Core Concems ofPlea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 770 (1998).
38.
Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 241(a) (Deering 2008) (requiring a punishment of a
fme not to exceed $1000 and/or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months for
assault) with 1d § 245(a) (requiring a punishment of two to four years imprisonment in state
prison or not exceeding one year in county jail and/or a fme not to exceed $10,000 for assault
with a deadly weapon).
39. Guidorizzi, supra note 37, at 768. Professor Stuntz notes that there are various
constitutionally-guaranteed trial rights that only apply to defendants who go to trial; .guilty pleas
eliminate those rights, leaving states "free to use even extortionate threats to induce pleas."
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1969, 20 18 (2008).
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40

conviction that occurs during trials. The other, and arguably more
troubling, issue is the potential for innocent defendants to plead guilty.
The fear of the potential maximum sentence a judge or a jury can impose
as a result of a guilty trial verdict may cause even the innocent defendant
to partake in an unfortunate risk assessment. Here, the defendant is
faced with a choice where the cost of pleading guilty is far outweighed
by the fear of going to trial. A risk-averse, yet innocent, defendant who is
well-advised by counsel might choose a lesser sentence attendant to a
guilty plea, rather than go to trial and face a maximum penalty.41
Plea bargaining supporters, especially prosecutors, have pushed
hard in support of the process; opponents have clearly lost the argument
in the United States Supreme Court, as seen in the pivotal case of
Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 42 In that case, a Kentucky state grand jury
indicted Hayes on a charge of ''uttering a forged instrument in the
amount of $88.30.'>43 The offense was punishable by two to ten years in
prison.44 Hayes's lawyer and the Commonwealth's attorney engaged in
plea negotiations, during which the prosecutor offered to recommend a
term of five years imprisonment if Hayes pled guilty. 45 However, the
prosecutor threatened that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would charge
Hayes under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, which would subject
Hayes to a mandatory life sentence based on his two prior felony
convictions.46 Hayes rejected the plea bargain, was charged as threatened,
47
and eventually lost at trial. He was sentenced to life in prison pursuant
to the Act. 48

40.
Guidorizzi, supra note 37, at 768.
41.
See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L.
REv. 780, 841 (2006); see also Andrew Taslitz, The Gw:tty Plea State, CRIM. JusT., Fall 2008, at 4,
4. The Innocence Project reports that about 25% of the 220 prisoners who have been exonerated
by DNA evidence were convicted with some sort of false confession, incriminating statement, or
by pleading guilty. See Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: False Confessions,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). It
has identified common reasons for such actions including diminished capacity, mental
impairment, ignorance of the law, fear of violence, and the threat of a harsh sentence. Id It is
also common for innocent defendants who have falsely confessed to police to agree to a plea
bargain out of belief that the false confession will ensure a guilty verdict at trial. See id
42.
434 U.S. 357 (1978).
43.
Id at 358.
44.
ld
45.
Jd
46. At the postindictment/pretrial meeting, the prosecutor said directly "that if Hayes did
not plead guilty and 'save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial,' he would return to
the grand jury to seek an indictment under" the recidivist statute. Id at 358-59.
47.
/dat359.
48.
Id
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The Supreme Court faced a dilemma. The Justices had indicated in
a line of cases that a person cannot be punished for exercising
49
constitutionally protected rights. Hayes had a constitutional right to a
trial by jury, and it appeared that the prosecutor had penalized him for
exercising that right. In another line of Supreme Court cases, however,
the Court had strongly endorsed the guilty plea process as an important
component of the United States' criminal justice system. The Court,
therefore, had to decide the constitutionality of a very common practice
in plea bargaining: the state prosecutor's threat to indict a defendant on a
more severe charge if the defendant chooses to exercise the right to a trial
by jury instead of pleading guilty. 50
Defending guilty pleas and plea bargaining, the Court highlighted
some points that it had previously addressed regarding the process: "the
51
importance of counsel during plea negotiations;' "the need for a public
52
record indicating that a plea was knowingly and voluntarily made," and
''the requirement that a prosecutor's plea-bargaining promise must be
kept." 53 However, the Justices were able to distinguish the actions of
Hayes's prosecutor from the "vindictive" measures admonished in earlier
decisions. 54 According to the Court, plea bargaining is a fair practice

49. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (holding the federal
kidnapping statute that only allowed juries to recommend the death penalty was violative of due
process by discouraging the defendant's exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to plead not guilty
and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Griffm v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)
(disallowing comment by judge or prosecutor on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination because to do so would constitute a penalty for exercise of that right).
50. The Court's exact constitutional question was "whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea
negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the
offense with which he was originally charged." Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358.
51. Id at 362 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,758 (1970)).
52. Id (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242 (1969)).
53. Id (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971)).
54. See id at 362-65. The Court held that vindictiveness must play no part in sentencing
a defendant in a new trial after he has successfully attacked his first conviction, and that a
prosecutor must not reindict a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the defendant
invoked an appellate remedy, since in that instance there is a "realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness."' Id at 362 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)). These earlier
cases "deal[t] with the State's unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen
to exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction." Id The practice of plea bargaining, in
contrast, is an ongoing negotiation process in which the prosecution and the defendant '"arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power."' Id (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,
809 (1970). The unconstitutionality of vindictiveness, therefore, lay in the fact that there is a
danger, "not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from exercising a legal right, ...
but . . . that the State might . . . retaliat[e] against the accused for lawfully attacking his
conviction." Id at 363 (citations omitted). It is a violation of a defendant's due process rights to
punish him simply "because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do." Id ("[I]n the
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because there is a mutuality of advantage to both prosecutors and
defendants. The Court responded to the notion that prosecutors act
vindictively by threatening to bring more severe charges if a defendant
does not forgo her right to a trial. Confronting a defendant with such a
situation is simply "[']an inevitable'-and permissible-' attribute of any
legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of
pleas."'55 Because the American justice system has decided to allowand even encourage-the negotiation of pleas, "[i]t follows that [the
Supreme] Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate
the ... reality that the prosecutor's interest [in plea bargaining] is to
persuade the defendant to forgo [the] right to plead not guilty."56
Bordenkircher sent a striking message to prosecutors and defense
attorneys: the government lawyers have extremely broad discretion; they
can charge (and threaten) virtually anything and everything necessary to
get the deal done. The defendants, however, are given a different script:
take the offer or else. 57 The Court decided that threats of an enhanced
charge and graver punishment used by prosecutors to assure a guilty plea
were in the State's best interest and were not inherently unfair. 58 This is
the result of the fact that in order to charge a defendant with a crime, a
prosecutor is only required to have probable cause to believe that an
accused has committed that crime. Harshness and ugly threats will not
constitutionally limit the prosecutor's discretion in this area. Additionally,
this discretion became even more stark with the mandatory sentencing
and guidelines jurisprudence discussed below. 59 As a consequence, grave
'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long
as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.").
55. Id at364(quotingChatrm v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,31 (1973)).
56. ld
57. "The incentive to plead applies to innocent and guilty defendants alike .... [I]t may
apply more strongly to innocents, who are more risk averse than their guilty counterparts."
Stuntz, supra note 41, at 841.
58. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365. The Court addressed prosecutorial vindictiveness later in United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). Once again, the prosecutor's broad
discretion was accepted, since there is no presumption of vindictiveness in the usual pretrial
negotiation context. Id at 381. In the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may
uncover additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution, or he simply may
come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance. Id At this
stage of proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution "may not
have crystallized." Id See generally Michael M. O'Hear, The End o!Bordenkircher: Extending
the Logic ofApprendi to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 835 (2006).
59. See inffa Part IV Commentators have strenuously debated the impact of varying
sentencing regimes on the prosecutors' bargaining power and ultimate discretion. See, e.g.,
O'Hear, supra note 58; Jeffrey Standen, The End ofthe Era ofSentencing Guidelines: Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REv. 775 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal
Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2548, 2558 (2004); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and
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concerns exist as to whether American prosecutors are able to circumvent
entrenched constitutional rights in the pretrial context during plea
bargaining. 60 U.S. prosecutors appear to have a stranglehold on
defendants and their lawyers, primarily because the prosecutor has the
broad power to define the scope of charges brought against the defendant.
This power is readily accepted and approved of because of the sense that
in plea bargaining there is a "give-and-take" negotiations process, in
which the prosecution and defense have arguably equal bargaining
power. 61

B.

Australia

Australian prosecutors, like their U.S. counterparts, are the
gatekeepers to the criminal justice system, determining which criminal
charges will be prosecuted and how they will be prosecuted. In both
jurisdictions, their role is pivotal to the integrity and efficacy of the
criminal justice system.62 However, there are also significant differences
between both the responsibilities of and constraints governing the
practices of Australian and American prosecutors.
·
In Australia, there are two categories of prosecutors. Serious crimes
heard by superior courts are prosecuted by legal practitioners employed
by statutory Directors of Public Prosecution (DPP), which operate in

Plea Bargaining: Mats Discovery Got To Do with It?, CRIM. JusT., Fall 2008, at 28. One astute
commentator succinctly captured this idea: "No government official has as much unreviewable
power or discretion as the prosecutor. Few regulations bind or even guide prosecutorial
discretion, and fewer still work well." Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation ~mus
Prosecutorial Accountability, !57 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 959 (2009).
60.
See Stuntz, supra note 41, at 791.
61. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362. As stated by the former Chief Justice in Santobello v.
New JVrk, 404 U.S. 257,260-61 (1971):
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining;• is an essential component of the
Properly administered, it is to be encouraged....
administration of justice.
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process
but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confmement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when
they are ultimately imprisoned.
62. John McKechnie, Directom ofPublic Prosecutions: Independent and Accountable, 26
U. W. AUSTL. L. REv. 268, 271-72 (1996); Ivan L Potas, Measuring Prosecutorial Discretion, in
PROSECIJTORJAL DISCRETION, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY SEMJNAR PROCEEDINGS 79 NOVEMBER 1984 (Ivan L. Potas ed., 1985).
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each State and at the Federal level.63 The office of DPP is a relatively
recent phenomenon, created as a result of difficulties encountered with
prosecution at less than arm's length from the government.64 At the
summary level, where the majority of minor crimes such as drunk
driving, minor assaults, and thefts are tried, prosecutions continue to be
largely administered by police officers with specialist training in law and
advocacy. 65 To the American eye, and in the view of some senior
prosecutors in Australia,66 deploying nonlawyers-who are not subject to
the ethical constraints that govern those admitted to the bar, are unable to
claim privilege over their communications, and are not fully trained in
the law to prosecute the majority of criminal cases-may seem like a
false economy, especially given instances of corruption that come to light
67
However, there is scant evidence that police
from time to time.
prosecutors are generally corrupt, inefficient, or incompetent. 68 Consequently, it seems that the administrative inertia and financial resourcing
required to overcome the status quo remain substantial barriers in most
Australian jurisdictions to the wholesale transfer of all prosecutions to
the DPP.

63. See Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1983 (Austl.); Director of Public
Prosecutions Act, 1986 (N.S.W:); Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1991 (N. Terr.); Director of
Public Prosecutions Act, 1984 (Queens!.); Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1991 (S. Austl.);
Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1973 (Tas.); Public Prosecutions Act, 1994 (Viet.); Director
ofPublic Prosecutions Act, 1991 (W Austl.).
64. Richard Refshauge, Prosecutorial Discretion-Australia, in THE CONVERGENCE OF
LEGALSYSTEMSINTifE21STCENfURY: AN AUSTRALIAN APPROACH 358-59 (Gabriel A. Moens &
Rodolphe Biffot eds., 2002).
65. JILL HUNTER ET AL., LmGATION VOLUME 11: EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL PROCESS 716
(7th ed. 2005). However, the Commonwealth and the Australian Capital Territory are exceptions.
All summary prosecutions in these jurisdictions are undertaken by statutory Directors of Public
Prosecution. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Steps in the Commonwealth Prosecution
Process, http://www.cdpp.gov.au!Practice/ProsecutionProcess.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2010);
Australian Capital Territory, Director of Public Prosecutions, http://dpp.act.gov.au (last visited
Apr. 5, 2010).
66. MiCHAEL ROZENES, PROSECUIDRIAL DISCRETION IN AUSTRALIA TODAY 4 (2004),
http://www.aic.gov/au/events/aic%20upcorning<>/o20events/1996/-media/conferences/prosecuting/
rozenes.ashx; Chris Corns, Police Summary Prosecutions: The Past, Present and Future, Paper
Presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference on the History of Crime, Policing
and Punishment (Dec. 9-10, 1999), in POLICING TifE LUCKY COUNTRY (Mike Enders & Benoit
Dupont eds., 2001), unedited version available athttp://www.aic.gov.au/events/aic%20upcoming
%20events/1999/hcpp.aspx (quoting from a number of state DPPs in favor of transferring
summary prosecutions from the police to the DPP).
67. See, e.g., N.S.W: INDEP. CoMM'N AGAINST CORRUPTION, INVESTIGATION INTO TifE
RELATIONSHIP BE1WEEN POLICE AND CRIMINALS, SECOND REPORT 54-55 ( 1994).
68. Ken Drew, The New South Wales Police Prosecutor, in IMPROVING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: THE FUTURE OF PARALEGAL PROFESSIONALS 103 (Julia Vernon & Francis Regan eds.,
1992).
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To promote the dispassionate exercise of prosecutorial power and
discretion, prosecutors (whether police prosecutors or DPP officers)
generally do not participate in the criminal investigation process or in
decisions to charge suspects. 69 These are areas reserved for police and
other criminal investigation units. At least insofar as serious crimes are
concerned, institutional separation of the DPP from the government, and
thus from direct accountability to the community, is designed to
depoliticize the office and ensure that prosecutions are carried out
lawfully and fairly and are not unduly influenced by media-manipulated
community campaigns. 70
However, Australian de-politicization has a downside, compounded
by limited judicial review of prosecutorial discretion 71 and almost
nonexistent parliamentary oversight. 72 Lack of transparency and
accountability has led to complaints that Australian prosecutors are
secretive, remote from victims of crime and the community generally,
and that they poorly document their dealings and decision making. 73

69. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 717; see ROZENES, supra note 66, at 3. Nonetheless,
there is substantial precharge consultation between the prosecution service and investigators.
Damian Bugg, Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, Speech at the 2007 Rule of Law
Conference: The Independence of the Prosecutor and the Rule of Law 20-21 (Aug. 31-Sept. 1,
2007), http://www.lawcouncil.asn.aullibrary/speeches/speeches-rule-of-law.cfin.
70. HUNTERET AL., supra note 65, at 718; see Refshauge, supra note 64, at 358; see also
Price v. Ferris (1994) 74 A. Crirn. R. 127, 130 (per Kirby P.) ("What is the object of having a
Director of Public Prosecutions? Obviously, it is to ensure that a high degree of independence in
the vital task of making prosecution decisions and exercising prosecution discretions. Its purpose
is illustrated in the present case. The Court was informed that, in the prosecution of a police
officer, it is now normal practice in this State for the prosecution to be 'taken over' from a private
prosecutor or informant and conducted by the DPP. The purpose of so acting is to ensure that
there is manifest independence in the conduct of the prosecution. It is to avoid the suspicion that
important prosecutorial discretions will be exercised otherwise than on neutral grounds. It is to
avoid the suspicion, and to answer the occasional allegation, that the prosecution may not be
conducted with appropriate vigour. Analyses by law reform and other bodies have demonstrated
conclusively how vital are the decisions made by prosecutors.").
71. Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion is limited to rare cases where an abuse of
process can be established. See Maxwell v. The Queen (1996) 184 C.L.R. 501, 513-14.
Otherwise, "[d]ecisions to commence, not to commence[,] or to terminate a prosecution are made
independently of the courts." Pnce 74 A. Crirn. R. at 130. The High Court has stated in The
King v. Weaver(l931) 45 C.L.R. 321, 334: "It is entirely a matter for the law officers of the
Crown to determine the form of prosecution, and for the Court to determine whether the charge
made had been supported."
72. Refshauge, supra note 64, at 357 n.39.
73. Robyn Holder & Nicole Mayo, U1Jat Do Women Want? Prosecuting Family Violence
in the ACT, 15 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 5, 12 (2003); ROZENES, supra note 66, at 2;
Refshauge, supra note 64, at 354. In South Australia, following a particularly controversial plea
"More prescriptive
bargain, the Solicitor-General, Chris Kourakis QC, recommended:
requirements as to consultations with victims and police and recording and reporting of
negotiations should be adopted." Press Release, House of Assembly, Plea Bargain Reforms
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Charge bargaining, the Australian term for plea bargaining, is a specific
target of such criticism. 74 Like the United States, charge bargaining is
well entrenched in Australian criminal practice with studies reporting
that defense counsel engage in charge bargaining in at least 50% of their
cases. 75 However, to many Australians, charge bargaining is redolent of
backroom deals between overly cozy prosecution and defense lawyers
seeking to minimize the time, effort, and resources required to prosecute
cases properly and ensure that sentencing principles and the rule of law
76
are observed. There is a strong community view that, unchecked,
charge bargaining trivializes victims, leads to overly lenient sentencing of
the guilty, and unjustly punishes those who, in good faith, seek a trial of
the charges against them. 77
Nationally uniform guidelines comprise the primary mechanism for
regulating the use of prosecutorial discretion, including discretion over
charge bargaining. 78 Although the guidelines are not directly enforceable,
their breach may assist in establishing an abuse of process 79 or a

Recommended by Kourakis Report (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://netk.net.au/Parliament/
Medial.asp.
74. Refshauge, ·supra note 64, at 381; Robert D. Seifinan & Arie Freiberg, Plea
B8IlJaining in Victoria: The Role ofCounsel, 25 CRIM. L.J. 64, 64 (2001 ).
75. Seifinan & Freiberg, supra note 74, at 68. An earlier study by Kathy Mack and
Sharon R. Anleu, found charge bargaining occurred "nearly every day" at the defense bar. KATHY
MACK & SHARON R. ANLEU, PLEADING GUILTY: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 20 (1995).
76. NSW Revamps Sentencing Guidelines, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.
theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197 ,23032363-5006784,00.htrnl; ACT VICTIMS OF CRIME
COORDINATOR, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE: OPERATION OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT 1994 IN THE
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 1996-2007, at 79 (2008), available at http://www. victirnsupport.
act.gov.au/res/File/Quality"/o20of'lo20Justice%20June%202008.pdf; GORDON SAMUELS, REVIEW
OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES DIRECTOR OF PuBLIC PROSECUTIONS' POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR
CHARGE BARGAINING AND TENDERING OF AGREED FACTS § 6.1 (2002), http://www.lawlink.nsw.
gov.au/report/lpd_reports.nsf/pages/report__gsamuels.
77. Rowena Johns, Victims of Crime: Plea Bargains, Compensation, Victim Impact
Statements and Support Services 52-53 (N.S.W Parliamentary Library Research Serv., Briefmg
Paper No. 10/02, 2002), http://www.parliament.nsf.gov/au/prodlparlment/pub1ications.nsf/0/578
C6F10C6D98565CA256ECF00083B4D/$File/10-02.pdf. Nonetheless, a defendant who chooses
to proceed to trial, while not entitled to the mitigation in sentence afforded a plea of guilty, should
not be punished for the way in which the defense was carried out. See Cameron v. The Queen
(2002) 209 C.L.R. 339, 351; Siganto v. The Queen (1998) 194 C.L.R. 656,666.
78. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION POLICY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 3 (2008), available at http://www.cdpp.gov.au!Publications/ProsecutionPolicy/
ProsecutionPolicy.pdf; TAS. DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION GUIDELINES, available at
http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution__guidelines (last visited Jan. 10, 201 0); S. AUSTL.
DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION POLICY & GUIDELINES, available at http://www.dpp.
sa.gov.au/03/prosecution__po1icy_quidelines.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 201 0); N.S.W OFFICE OF THE
DIR. OF PuB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION GUIDELINES 1 (2007), available at http://www.odpp.
nsw.gov.au/guidelines/guidelines.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
79. See MG v. R (2007) N.S.W Crim. Ct. App. 57, para. 59.
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miscarriage of justice on appeal. 80 In that way they offer defendants
some protection against improper inducements and coercion that may
arise in plea negotiations. In relation to charge bargaining, the guidelines
are primarily directed toward negotiations that revolve around the
exchange of guilty pleas to some offences and the withdrawal from
prosecution of others. The adequacy and admissibility of the evidence
and the reasonable prospects of conviction comprise a priori
considerations. Once it has been determined that sufficient evidence
exists to warrant particular charges, the prosecutor is also bound to
consider the public interest. Even though sufficient evidence of guilt is
available, it may not be in the public interest to prosecute. The public
interest encompasses factors such as the seriousness of the offense, the
prior criminal history and personal circumstances of the defendant, the
prevalence of the offence and the need for deterrence, the attitude of the
alleged victim, and community attitudes toward the offence. In respect to
the choice of charges and charge bargaining, prosecutors are directed to
choose charges that adequately reflect the nature and extent of the
offence so that they provide the basis for an appropriate sentence. Under
no circumstances are charges to be laid for the purpose of subsequently
engaging in charge bargaining. Further, prosecutors are directed not to
entertain a charge bargaining proposal if the defendant maintains his or
her innocence. For reasons that will be explained below, the guidelines
only give cursory attention to negotiations regarding severity of sentence.
Nor is there any guidance regarding negotiations over the factual basis
upon which the offence is evaluated. Bargaining in relation to the
existence of mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offence or matters related to the defendant is therefore regulated by
general ethical principles governing the conduct ofprosecutors. 81
Reviews demonstrate that charge bargaining is not counterproductive to proper sentencing practice. 82 Still, in one state, New South
Wales, public disquiet and political pressure regarding perceived
inappropriate charge bargaining outcomes have been so fierce that
80.
See Livermore v. R (2006) N.S.W Crim. Ct. App. 334, para. 2.
81. See genemlly Seifman & Freiberg, supra note 74, regarding a survey of pmctice
among the Victorian Bar which found that negotiations regarding the severity of sentence and a
favomble summary of the factual basis of guilt were the second and third most popular form of
charge bargaining. Jd at 70-71. In fact, negotiations over the factual basis of guilt scored the
highest mean percentage involvement mte among Victorian barristers in charge bargaining. Jd at
70.
82. See, e.g., Denise Lievore, Prosecutona.J Discretion in Adult Sexual Assault Cases,
TRENDs & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Canberm, Austl.), Jan.
2005, at 1, 1; SAMUELS, supra note 76.
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Parliament has adopted a trial measure mandating compulsory
conferencing between defense and prosecution counsel and obligatory
sentencing discounts for guilty pleas. 83 The Criminal Case Conferencing
Trial Act, 2008, provides that if an offender pleads guilty to an offence
prior to being committed for sentence, the court must allow a discount of
25% on the term of imprisonment or fine that would otherwise be
imposed. 84 If the offender pleads not guilty and at any time after being
committed for trial decides to enter a guilty plea, the court may provide
the offender with a sentencing discount of 12.5%, which can be
increased if the court is satisfied that substantial grounds for doing so
have been established. 85 As it was enacted as a pilot measure, the Act
only operated between May 1, 2008 and May 1, 2009. 86 The Act was
introduced chiefly to reduce the last minute resolution of serious criminal
matters and to improve the effective deployment of judicial and
prosecution resources in criminal trials, but it also has had the collateral
effect of more strictly regulating the conduct of plea bargaining and of
limiting the discretion of the trial judge as to sentencing. 87
A number of other Australian jurisdictions adopted informal
sentencing indication guidelines, which outline likely discounts in
sentencing should a guilty plea be proffered. 88 These sentencing
guidelines overcome the Australian reluctance to involve the sentencing
judge in the plea bargain process,89 and thus constitute another point of

83.
See Criminal Case Conferencing Trial Act, 2008, § 17(1) (N.S.W:).
84.
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, R v. Thomson (2000) 115 N.S.W: Crim. Ct.
App. 104, 139, stated that a plea of guilty could attract a 35% discount on sentence.
85.
Criminal Case Conferencing Trial Act, 2008, § 17(2) (N.S.W:).
86.
Id § 5.
87.
See Dennis Miralis, Tougher Sentences for NSW 0/knders Pleading Guilty, 46 LAW
Soc'v J.,Aug. 2008, at 69,70-71.
88.
Arie Freiberg & John Willis, Sentence Indication, 27 CRIM. L.J. 246, 249 (2003).
89.
See the following from R v. Mafl.wo(1989) S.A. St. R. 503,509-10:
The prosecution has a role in the sentencing process which consists of presenting the
facts to the Court and of making any submissions which it thinks proper on the
question of what sentence ought to be imposed. The decision as to what sentence is to
be imposed is, however, entirely a matter for the Court which may, of course, be
influenced by the arguments that are placed before it by the prosecution as well as by
the defence, but must never be influenced by the attitudes or opinions as distinct from
the arguments of either. In particular it must be stressed that the attitude of the
prosecution towards a particular proposed course of action in relation to sentence is, as
such, irrelevant; the view of the prosecution has no greater weight than the arguments
advanced in support of that view. These propositions are elementary and fundamental
propositions relating to the administration of criminal justice by independent courts,
but their express elaboration may assist in clarifYing the confusion of thought which lay
at the root of some of the argument addressed on the present appeal.
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difference between the two jurisdictions. In Australia, if a plea of guilty
is proffered, discussion between the prosecution and the trial judge as to
the appropriate discount in sentencing that a defendant should receive
would be regarded as highly improper. 90 Negotiation outside of the
courtroom is confined to defense and prosecution counsel. Typically, as
the prosecution guidelines referred to earlier indicate, defense counsel
may propose that a guilty plea91 will be accepted by the defendant on the
basis that the prosecution will not oppose a submission to the sentencing
judge that the penalty for the offence ought to fall within a nominated
range. Under the guidelines prosecutors may only agree to such requests
where the nominated range is consistent with an acceptable exercise of
the court's sentencing discretion. However, any agreement between the
prosecution and defense counsel of this nature will not bind the
sentencing judge and will only operate as a submission before the court.92
Notwithstanding earlier criticism from some members of the judiciary
who are wary of applying both a simplistic mathematical discount for a
guilty plea upon an otherwise determined sentence, 93 and also concerned
by the potential discriminatory effect against persons who exercise their
right to a trial, 94 the sentencing guidelines that permit an identified

See also Malvaso v. The Queen (1989) 168 C.L.R. 227, 233; GAS v. The Queen (2004) 217
C.L.R. 198, 210.
90. SeeR v. Pugh (2005) 158 A. Crim. R. 302, 339-44; R v. Marshall (1981) V.R. 725,
733-34; The Queen v. Tait (1979) 46 F.L.R. 386,387-88. In each of these cases sentencing judges
were directed that any submissions regarding agreement between prosecution and defense
counsel with respect to sentence should be made in open court in the presence of both counsel
and the defendant.
91. A study by Seifinan and Freiberg demonstrated that plea bargaining was usually
initiated by defense counsel and on some occasions at summary level as suggested by the
presiding magistrate. Seifman & Freiberg, supra note 74, at 69. This situation, of course, is very
much unlike that seen in the U.S. where prosecutors routinely initiate the process.
92. See LJW v. Western Australia (2007) W.A.S.C.A. 68, para. 46; Ahmad v. Regina
(2006) N.S.W. Crim. Ct. App. 117, para. 21 (citing GAS v. The Queen (2004) 217 C.L.R. 198,
21 0-11 ). In Ahmad v. Regina, the sentencing judge refused to accept a 25% discount for a plea of
guilty agreed to by the prosecution and defense counsel. [2006] N.S.W.C.C.A. 117 paras. 6, 9.
Instead, the sentencing judge applied a sentencing discount of 15%. Id para. 10. The New South
Wales Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's determination noting:
The agreement can neither bind the judge nor be given any greater weight than is
appropriate to a submission of counsel with knowledge of the facts relevant to the
offence and the offender. It must of course be carefully considered but carries no
greater weight than any other submission which the Crown may make in the sentencing
process. If it were otherwise the fundamental assumption that it is for the judge to
determine an appropriate sentence would be seriously compromised.
Id para. 23.
93. See, e.g., Wong v. The Queen (2001) 207 C.L.R. 584,611-12.
94. See, e.g., Cameron v. The Queen (2002) 209 C.L.R. 339, 343.
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discount in sentencing for a plea of guilty have been subsequently
approved by the Australian High Court.95
As in the United States, Australian charge bargaining performs an
important utilitarian function in the criminal justice system by avoiding
costly and unnecessary trials, saving the victims of offending the distress
associated with attending and testifying in court, and assuring that
criminality is punished in a timely manner. However, rather than
focusing upon the potentially coercive nature of charge bargaining and
concomitant sentence indication schemes, as practiced in the United
States, the Australian community appears to be more concerned by the
notion that charge bargaining leads to "horse trading" between the
prosecution and the defense and results in the "sale" of justice. There is
substantial concern that offenders are not receiving their 'just desserts."
That community concern is exacerbated by the general lack of
transparency and accountability over prosecutorial discretion collateral to
the creation of a strong and independent prosecution service. The
tension between a strong and independent prosecution service and
responsiveness to community concern over criminal behavior is but a
microcosm of a larger law and order debate reflected more generally in
sentencing, which is discussed later in this Article.
Ill. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Double jeopardy is one area where the two systems of criminal
justice are substantially at odds. The Americans remain firm in their
commitment to the guarantees established centuries ago. There is
considerable movement away from that commitment by the Australians,
as there is by the English.
A.

Australia

There is no constitutional basis for the doctrine of double jeopardy
in Australia. After a comparative analysis of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence in the United States, just two years ago the New South
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that the principle of finality
of verdict lay outside of Australian constitutional protection.96 Rather, the

95. Markarian v. The Queen (2005) 228 C.L.R. 357, 375.
96. R v. JS (2007) 230 F.L.R. 275, 306-09 (Mason, P., concurring). The argument
proffered by the defendant in this case was that Crown appeals against acquittal were
constitutionally prohibited by the Constitution of Australia Act, section 80. Id at 294
(Spigelrnan, CJ, lead opinion). Section 80 guarantees trial by jury for indictable federal offences.
Id The defendant argued that the principle of trial by jury incorporated the finality of jury
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Court found that double jeopardy was a creature of the common law and
therefore subject to statutory limitation or negation. 97 Indeed, despite
article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 98
the double jeopardy principle has been qualified-allowing retrials for
acquittals in the face of fresh and compelling evidence-by the following
state enactments: Crimes (Appeal & Review) Amendment (Double
Jeopardy) Act, 2006 (N.S.W); Criminal Code (Double Jeopardy)
Amendment Act, 2007 (Queensl.); and Criminal Law Consolidation
(Double Jeopardy) Amendment Act, 2008 (S. Austl.). There is also a
recommendation from the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee
that double jeopardy be reformed at the federallevel. 99
The Australian law of double jeopardy springs from the older,
narrower doctrines of autrefois convict/acquit 100 Autrefois convict/acquit
are defenses to a criminal charge both at common law and under statute.
Thus the Queensland Criminal Code provides:
It is a defence to a charge of any offence to show that the accused person
has already been tried, and convicted or acquitted upon an indictment on
which the person might have been convicted of the offence with which the
person is charged, or has already been acquitted upon indictment, or has
already been convicted, of an offence of which the person might be
convicted upon the indictment or complaint on which the person is
!01
charge d.

While each doctrine aims to prevent inconsistent verdicts and to preserve
finality, they are slightly different in purpose. Autrefois convict has been
characterized as similar to merger in res judicata, and is intended to
preclude double punishment, whereas autrefois acquit is characterized as
verdicts. Id This was rejected and the validity of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, 2001,
section I 07 (N.S.W:) was upheld. Id at 305.
97. Id at 303.
98. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) entered into force
in Australia on November 13, 1980. 1980 Austl. T.S. No. 23. However, international treaties like
the ICCPR are not self-executing in Australia, and therefore remain nonbinding in domestic law
unless implemented by statute. Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292,305.
99. MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS COMM. (MCCOC), AUSTL. AIToRNEY GENERAL'S
DEP'T, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (2004), http://www.ag.gov.au/www.agd/wpattach.nsf!VAP/CCFD7369
FCAE9B8F32F341 DBE09780 1FF)-Double+Jeopardy+ Report+25+Mar.pdf/$file/Double+Jeopa
rdy+Report+25+Mar.pdf.
100. See Marion S. Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Pedod of the ~ar Books, 82 U. PA. L.
REv. 602, 602 (1934); Jill Hunter, The Development of the Rule Against Double Jeopardy, 5 J.
LEGAL HIST. I, 4 (1984).
101. Criminal Code Act, 1899, § 17 (Queens!.). Analogous statutory provisions from other
states include: Criminal Procedure Act, 2004, § 126(3) (W: Austl.); Criminal Code Act, 1924,
§ II (Tas.); Criminal Code Act, 2009, §§ 18-20 (N. Terr.); Criminal Procedure Act, 1986, § 156
(N.S.W:); Crimes Act, 1958, § 394 (Viet.); Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, § 285 (S.
Austl.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 283 (Austl. Cap. Terr.).
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a "species of estoppel" designed to prevent the ordeal of multiple
102
prosecutions. In either case, it must be shown that the elements of the
offence charged are the same or substantially the same as those for which
the accused was previously convicted or acquitted. 103 This latter
requirement substantially constricts the scope of each doctrine. Hence in
R v. I: NJ (No. 2), neither autrefois acquit nor autrefois convict applied
with respect to the prosecution of the defendant for murder, even though
the defendant had been previously convicted and sentenced for wounding
with intent and acquitted of attempted murder in relation to the same
injuries which eventually led to the victim's death. 104 Nor do the pleas
apply to a verdict which is unavailable at law such that the defendant is
not "in jeopardy." Accordingly, in Island Man'time Ltd v. Filipowski,
autrefois acquit was unavailable where a prosecution was dismissed
following a "no case to answer" submission arising out of a defective
summons. 105
As a result, the double jeopardy principle has been extended beyond
autrefois acquit! convict and incorporated within the doctrine of abuse of
process. Abuse of process in Australia is somewhat of a potpourri of
illustrations of the exercise of inherent power that all superior courts have
to control the integrity of their own processes. Despite a lack of precise
definition, it is generally accepted that abuse of process comprises one or
more of the following elements: (1) invoking of the court's process for
106
an illegitimate purpose, for example, initiating a prosecution for the
purpose of persecuting an innocent defendant rather than securing the
107
conviction of the guilty; (2) the use of process in a manner that is
unjustifiably oppressive, for example, unreasonably delaying prosecution
of the defendant and thereby depriving him or her of the ability to
adequately defend prosecution; 108 or (3) using the court's process in a
102. The Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55, para. 30; Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194
C.L.R. 610, 626-27; R v. Stone (2005) 157 A. Crim. R. 41, 48.
103. SeeR v. P, NJ (No. 2) (2007) 99 S.A. St. R. 1, 6; Gilham v. The Queen (2007) 178 A.
Crim. R. 72, 82; Pearce, 194 C.L.R. at 615-16.
104. 99 S.A. St. R. at 10, 25 (special leave to appeal to the High Court refused, [2009]
H.C.A. 6).
I 05. (2006) 226 C.L.R. 328, 331-32.
I 06. PNJ v. R. (2009) H.C.A. 6, para. 3; Rogers v. The Queen (1994) 181 C.L.R. 251, 286.
107. See, e.g., Zollo v. Nat'! Austl. Bank, S.A.S.C. 38, para. 22 (2009); Williams v. Spautz
(1992) 174 C.L.R. 509,526-27.
108. See The Queen v. Davis (1995) 57 F.C.R. 512, 520; Jago v. Dist. Court of N.S.W.
(1989) 168 C.L.R. 23, 30. See also R v. Benbrika (2008) 182 A. Crim. R. 205, 223-24, where the
court threatened to stay proceedings because the conditions in which the accused were held on
remand led to impairment of mental function such that the accused were not able to properly
instruct their legal counsel nor participate in their trial. The stay was granted until the conditions
of incarceration were ameliorated. Id at 236.
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manner that brings the administration of justice into disrepute. 109 Where
abuse of process is appropriately raised, the court has discretion to stay
criminal proceedings. The exercise of the discretion involves balancing
the interests of the community with those of the applicant.
Generally speaking, where evidence is admitted in a subsequent
trial that is manifestly inconsistent with a prior acquittal, the balancing
process referred to above will favor the exercise of the discretion to stay
proceedings, 110 even though technically the plea of autrefois acquit does
not apply. Thus, in The Queen v. Carroll, the High Court found that a
petjury indictment was an abuse of process that ought to have been
stayed by the trial judge because it was based on the premise that the
defendant had lied in a previous murder trial where he had denied his
guilt on oath. 111 This was the case even though the plea of autrefois
acquit could not be established since petjury was not a verdict available
on his trial for murder and the verdict of murder was not available on his
trial for petjury. 112
In G1lham v. The Queen, the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal extended the principle of incontrovertibility to convictions,
holding that manifest inconsistency between a prior conviction and a new
criminal prosecution would also attract discretion to stay proceedings. 113
The defendant in Gilham had previously pled guilty to the manslaughter
of his brother on the basis that he had killed his brother after being
provoked by the brother's murder of their parents. 114 Following further
investigation, the defendant was subsequently charged with the murder of
115
his parents. Notwithstanding a determination that the manslaughter
conviction was manifestly inconsistent with a conviction for the murder
of his parents, the Court held that the prosecution did not amount to an
abuse of process warranting its intervention. 116 This rested on the basis
that the defendant was never in jeopardy of being convicted of the
109. SeeThe Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55, para. 86; Pearce v. The Queen (1998) 194
C.L.R. 610, 625; see also Rogers, 181 C.L.R. at 268 (fmding that multiple prosecutions for the
same offence were an abuse of process because they were contrary to the need for judicial
determinations to be treated as incontrovertibly correct, which would tend to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute).
110. Compare Gilham v. The Queen (2007) 178 A. Crim. R. 72, 88 [2002], with Carroll
[2002] H.C.A. 55, paras. 42, 51. See generally The Queen v. Storey (1978) 140 C.L.R. 364;
Garrett v. The Queen (1977) 139 C.L.R. 437.
Ill. [2002] H.C.A. 55, para. 51.
112. ld
113. 178 A. Crim. R. at 88.
114. Id at 75.
115. Id
116. Id at 91-92.
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murder of his parents in the first trial. 117 More importantly, the Court
determined that the community interest required the defendant to be put
to trial for the murder of his parents where there was reasonable evidence
of his guilt. 118 In the Court's view, the scandal of inconsistent verdicts
was substantially outweighed by the scandal of allowing a potential
murderer to escape trial. 119
However, outside of prosecutions involving incontrovertibility,
analogous to the exercise of the discretion to exclude illegally obtained
evidence examined in our previous article, it appears fairly unlikely that
Australian courts will stay proceedings, reserving this remedy for
exceptional cases. 120 Given the unlikelihood that the discretion to stay
proceedings will be exercised, it is therefore surprising that the Council
of Australian Governments (COAG) determined that the principle of
double jeopardy applicable to acquittals should be reformed. 121
The COAG recommendation followed reforms instituted in the
United Kingdom by the Criminal Justice Act, 2003. Still, the impetus for
reform was home grown rather than imported from the former "mother
country," stemming from community disquiet and a media campaign
generated in the aftermath of the High Court's decision in The Queen v.
Carrolrz 2 and the release of the Model Criminal Code Officers
Committee Discussion Paper. 123 Consequently, the reforms fall into a
wider "law and order" agenda that perceives the protection of rights as a
failure to prioritize community security properly and ensure that
criminality is punished. To that extent, the double jeopardy reforms,

117. Id
118. Id at 132.
119. Id at 122. The Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, excludes conviction of a lesser
offence from the scope of provisions creating exceptions to the double jeopardy rule. Criminal
Code Act, 1899, § 678A(2) (Queensl.).
120. A stay of proceedings is an order that any further criminal prosecutions cease. A stay
can be permanent or temporary. A permanent stay insulates the defendant from all further
prosecution and therefore should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. See Island Mar.
Ltd. v. Filipowski (2006) 226 C.L.R. 328, 341; see also [2006] N.S.W:C.C.A. 392 para. 101;
Pearce v. The Queen ( 1998) 194 C.L.R. 610, 620 (declining to issue a stay based partly on such
reasoning).
121. See Council of Austl. Gov'ts (COAG), Council of Australian Governments' Meeting
13 April 2007, Double Jeopardy Law Reform, http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/
2007-04-13/index_old.cfin.
122. Kelley Burton, Double Jeopardy: The Queensland Refonn, PR.ocmR, Apr. 2008, at
21, 21.
123. Law Council of Austl., Model Criminal Code: Chapter 2: Issue Estoppel, Double
Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals Against Acqwtta/s (Law Council of Austl., Discussion Paper,
Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.aulshadomx/apps/fins/finsdownload.cfin?
file_uuid=330EOF8D-IE4F-17FA-D2EC-735FE715E653&siteName=lca.
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which limit what was previously considered an inviolable right, 124 relate
to the commentary upon the Australian official-centric approach to
criminal procedure outlined in our earlier article.
Interestingly, both the Australia Capital Territory and Victoria,
which have adopted Human Rights Charters, reserved their position in
relation to COAG's determination. COAG's recommendation directly
conflicts with section 26 of the Victoria Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act and section 24 of the Australia Capital Territory
Human Rights Act, 2004, both of which mirror article 14(7) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These provisions
protect the finality of acquittals and convictions as long as they are made
according to law. 125
The reform model adopted by COAG recommends that a person
acquitted of an offence should not be protected by double jeopardy
where:
1.

2.

3.

Fresh and compelling evidence attained subsequent to the original
COAG recommended that this
acquittal demonstrates guilt.
exception only apply in relation to the retrial of serious criminal cases
including murder, manslaughter, trafficking or manufacturing
commercial quantities of drugs, aggravated rape, arid armed robbery.
The original acquittal is tainted by false evidence or corruption and it
is more likely than not that but for the false evidence or corruption
the accused would have been convicted.
The subsequent prosecution is for an offence contrary to the
administration of justice, for example, bribery of a juror or a witness,
126
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, or perjury.

Subject to variations, this is the model adopted in the legislation in New
South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia, as outlined at the
commencement of Part III.A. 127 In those states, applications for retrial of
an acquittal must be made by the Director of Public Prosecutions to the
Court of Criminal Appeal, Court of Appeal, or the Full Court of the
Supreme Court respectively, which may order retrial if it considers that in

124. See Mirko Bagaric & Luke Neal, Double Jeopardy in Australia: The Illusion of an
Absolute Protection and the Prosecution Process as Punishment, 8 CANBERRA L. REv. 87, 109
(2005).
125. King v. Fricker (2007) A.C.T.S.C. 101.
126. See COAG, supra note 121. In relation to this last ground for reforming double
jeopardy, COAG was heavily influenced by the outcome in The Queen v. CarroJJ discussed supra
Part liLA.
127. The New South Wales and Queensland provisions do not provide for the relaxation of
double jeopardy for a subsequent prosecution for an administration of justice offence.
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all the circumstances it is in the interests of justice that the order be
made. 128 Only one retrial may be ordered.
To date, case law on the provisions has been negligible, reflecting
both their "newness" and the slow pace of the criminal process in serious
criminal matters as well as the lack of many instances of miscarriage of
justice deriving from application of the double jeopardy principle. Even
the Carroll case, which in part generated the reforms, may not of itself
qualify for retrial under the reforms as the new evidence relating to bite
marks on the victim was characterized as of "doubtful quality."' 29 In
other words, even without double jeopardy, Carroll's conviction for
perjury should have been quashed.
The promotion of the reforms has been closely tied to technological
advances in criminal investigation, such as DNA profiling. 130 However,
there is no empirical evidence indicating the extent to which fresh DNA
evidence may be available for use during retrial.' 3 ' Older evidence may
not have been preserved sufficiently well to prevent contamination or
deterioration. 132 Furthermore, while fresh DNA evidence may be
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in relation to a prior conviction, it is
another matter entirely to find that DNA evidence will, of itself, most
likely lead to conviction. There may be a number of reasons why DNA
profile evidence could be consistent with innocence, such as police or
scientific misconduct. Ill

128. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act, 2001, pt. 8, div. 2 (N.S.W); Criminal Code, 1899,
ch. 68 (Queensl.); Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, pt. 10, div. 3 (S. Austl.). In South
Australia, the Full Court must be satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial in the
subsequent prosecution having regard to the effluxion of time between the acquittal and the retrial
and the failure of the prosecution or the police to act with reasonable diligence or expedition. Id
129. The Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55; Ex parte Attorney-General (2001) Q.C.A.
394, 61.
130. See, e.g., Gareth Griffith & Lenny Roth, DNA Evidence, WrongfUl Convictions and
WrongfUl Acquittals 39-40 (N.S.W Parliamentary Library Research Serv., Briefmg Paper
No.ll/06, 2006), available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.
nsf/key/DNAEvidence,WrongfuiConvictionsandWrongfuiAcquittals (last visited Apr. 8, 2009);
MCCOC, supra note 99, at 109.
131. See Chris Corns, Retrial of Acqwited Persons: Time for Reform of the Double
Jeopardy Rule?, 27 CRIM. L.J. 80, 99 (2003).
132. Adequate DNA is only available in one out of every five felony cases. David Lazer &
Michelle N. Meyer, DNA and the Criminal Justice System: Consensus and Debate, in DNA AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 359 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
133. David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part 1: The Exception to the
Rule Against Double Jeopardy for "New and Compelling EVIdence," 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
387,431-32 (2006).
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The United States

The concept of double jeopardy dates back well before the signing
of the United States Constitution;' 34 now, the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution is where U.S. citizens find their protected guarantee. 135 The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution states: "[No] person [shall]
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ...." 136 While the language may seem simple on its face, the Clause
and its wording have been quite difficult to apply through the years. 137
Double jeopardy has developed to include all criminal charges and all
ranges of punishment:
felonies and misdemeanors, as well as
imprisonment, fines, or other sanctions. 138 This guarantee can now be
summarized as prohibiting any criminal defendant from being twice
criminally punished or prosecuted in any way, for the same offense, by
the same sovereign. Where the Clause does apply, it is said that "its
sweep is absolute." 139 And, unlike the situation seen in other nations,
there has been no serious debate in the United States over limiting
protection here.
1.

Overview

The concept of double jeopardy can be traced back to ancient
Greece and Rome. 140 The Greek statesman Demosthenes remarked in
355 B.C.: "[T]he laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same
141
issue." Double jeopardy evolved slowly in English law, until formally
written and defined in Sir William Staunford's Les Plees del Coron in
134. DAVID J. BODENHAMER, OUR RIGHTS 148 (2007) (stating that double jeopardy came to
the United States from ancient Greece and Rome via English law).
135. U.S. CoNST. amend. V Double jeopardy protection applies to persons both federally
and in the states as per incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id amend. XN; Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) ("Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights
guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' . . . the same constitutional
standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments." (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 u.s. 145, 149 (1968))).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V
137. Even the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist found the Double Jeopardy Clause a
challenge: "[T]he decisional law in the area [of double jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." Albemaz v. United States,
450 u.s. 333, 343 (1981 ).
138. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,528 (1975) ("Although the constitutional language,
'jeopardy of life or limb,' suggests proceedings in which only the most serious penalties can be
imposed, the Clause has long been construed to mean something far broader than its literal
language.").
139. Burksv. UnitedStates,437U.S.I, II n.6(1978).
140. BODENHAMER, supra note 134, at 148.
141. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, at vii ( 1969).
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1557, and Sir Edward Coke's The Institutes on the Laws ofEngland in
1648. "[N]o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than
once, for the same offence." 142 Double jeopardy was likely made part of
the American Bill of Rights-much as other provisions in the Bill of
Rights-as a "check against a potentially tyrannical government and its
overzealous prosecutors." 143 The Amendment's language broadened the
prior meaning of double jeopardy so that the guarantee would grant
144
greater protection in the United States than in England and other
common law nations. 145
The unquestioned purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to
provide protection for the citizens against the great power of the state in
criminal justice matters.
[T]he State with all its resources and powers should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
146
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.

The Founders recognized a need to limit the government's potential for
abuse, harassment, and oppression so defendants would be protected
from "run[ning] the gantlet [sic]" in the court system. 147

142. Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., The Case o!Ex Parte Lange (or How the Double Jeopardy
Clause Lost Its "Life or Limb"), 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 62-63 (1999) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1769)). See also JAY A. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 17 (1969).
143. Limbaugh, supra note 142, at 66; see also GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
THE HiSTORY, THE LAW 50-51 (1998).
144. See BODENHAMER, supra note 134, at 148 (commenting that the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment would apply to less serious criminal cases rather than only capital
cases, as in England).
145. That clearly remains the case today, as discussed above. See supra Part III.A. Indeed,
some U.S. states grant even greater double jeopardy coverage than is required by the federal
Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Paulsen, 601 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. 1979) ("Retrial is precluded
[under the Colorado Constitution] even when the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting
the judgment of acquittal."); State v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150, !56 (Haw. 1994) (holding that "the
'same conduct' test" bars a second prosecution under state principles); Derado v. State, 622
N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ind. 1993) (fmding more protection than the federal standard regarding
conspiracy and the substantive offense); State v. Hogg, 385 A.2d 844, 846 (N.H. 1978) (holding
that estoppel-limiting sovereignty rules under the federal Constitution are inapplicable under state
law).
146. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
147. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,446 (1970); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
I, 11 (1978) ('"[D]ouble jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to
the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense." (quoting
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957))); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971) ("The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing a defendant 'twice in jeopardy'
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Beyond the need to protect defendants, the Double Jeopardy Clause
was created with the intent of balancing the competing issues of finality
and accuracy. 148 Society has an interest in convicting a defendant who
committed a crime. Still, we do not want someone previously acquitted
of an offense to be ripped from the life she may have had to rebuild and
be forced to revisit an accusation that was thought to have been
resolved. 149
2.

What Is Jeopardy?

Accused persons are only afforded protections from this Clause
when actually placed in jeopardy. 150 The beginning of the placement in
jeopardy is generally referred to as jeopardy attaching. 151 Jeopardy
attachment differs depending upon whether the criminal proceeding is a
jury trial or bench trial. In a jury trial attachment occurs when the entire
jury is sworn in, and in a nonjury trial jeopardy attaches when the judge
begins to hear evidence. 152
The ending of jeopardy is generally referred to as termination.
After attachment, jeopardy is not barred until termination. A simple
example of termination is an acquittal, which may be found for a variety
of reasons, including the court finding the evidence to be legally
insufficient to support a conviction. 153 The termination requirement is
also consistent with the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause: to
balance accuracy and finality. 154 The termination requirement allows for
exceptions in certain scenarios that are important to our legal system,
such as the appeals process and retrials in legitimate circumstances. 155
represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in federal criminal
proceedings.").
148. See, e.g., Jam, 400 U.S. at 479.
149. Of course, double jeopardy does not protect against a criminal and a civil charge (and
punishment) for the same act. See Schellenbach v. SEC, 989 F.2d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 1993).
150. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
151. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,471 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
152. Id There are obvious reasons why jeopardy attaches before there is a final judgment;
the most important is to protect the accused. If jeopardy attached only at fmal judgment, the
prosecution could "court shop." If the prosecution perceives the trial as going unfavorably, it
could withdraw from the case, only to recharge the accused in a different jurisdiction or court.
"[T]he prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand
trial." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). The U.S. courts have been vigilant in
determining that jeopardy attaches before the fmal judgment in order to avoid court shopping.
See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
153. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that when a court fmds that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support a conviction, jeopardy is terminated).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,479 (1971).
155. Such circumstances may include retrials after mistrials and hung juries. Richardson v.
United States, 468 U.S. 317,324 (1984) (holding that a retrial following a hung jury does not
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With an appeal, termination occurs when the convicted fails to challenge
her conviction successfully. Once a defendant files an appeal, she is
considered to have waived the double jeopardy rights. 156
3.

Protections

The Double Jeopardy Clause offers protection against subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense for which she has been
convicted, multiple punishments for the same offense, and a later trial of
the defendant for the same offense for which she has been acquitted. 157 It
is this last aspect that is of chief concern in this Article, for it is the one
that has occupied reformers in Australia and elsewhere.
The protection of the accused from prosecution after an acquittal
means that "the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to
convict him." 158 In the United States, there has been considerable
litigation on the issue of what constitutes an acquittal and when it occurs.
Procedurally, the protection applies to an acquittal whether it was by the
court in a bench trial or by a jury verdict. 159 Additionally, an acquittal can
be an acquittal of the charged offense as well as an acquittal of a
160
particular punishment.
An acquittal can occur when an offense is dismissed, and that
acquittal must be treated as final, barring certain conditions. 161 Finality
requires that the trial has proceeded to the defendant's introduction of
evidence, and the judge's order of dismissal was facially unqualified at
rnidtrial. 162 If there is a finding by the court or jury of insufficient
evidence to establish guilt, that finding will constitute an acquittal and
reprosecution is barred. 163 This rule has no exceptions no matter the
cause for the insufficiency. The acquittal and bar to reprosecution stand
if the insufficiency to support a finding of guilt was caused by
violate double jeopardy); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 10 I, 109 (2003) (holding that there
is no violation of double jeopardy to have a retrial following a hung jury, even in a capital case).
156. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957).
157. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (discussing the three "abuses" protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause).
158. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,343 (1975).
159. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462,467 (2005).
160. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,438 (1981) (holding that if a hearing resembles,
in all relevant respects, a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, a refusal by the jury to impose
the death penalty can operate as an acquittal of that punishment).
161. Smith, 543 U.S. at 473.
162. Id The acquittal is seen "as fmal, unless the availability of reconsideration ha[d] been
plainly established by pre-existing rule or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings
on the sufficiency of the evidence." Id
163. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,72-73 (1978).
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prosecutorial error in obtaining or admitting evidence at trial. In stark
contrast to what is being enacted or proposed elsewhere, double jeopardy
in the United States bars reprosecution even if new and strongly
incriminating evidence is later discovered after the finding of insufficient
evidence to establish guilt.' 64
There is no type of error, exception, or defect of any kind that has
the power to reverse or change an acquittal in American courts. 165 The
U.S. courts are quite serious about the finality of an acquittal. To be sure,
in one important case, the Justices wrote that there is no exception
permitting retrial once the defendant has been acquitted, no matter how
"egregiously erroneous" the legal rulings leading to that judgment might
be. 166 Correctness of the ruling for acquittal is not the determining factor;
rather, it is whether there was a substantive resolution in favor of the
defendant after jeopardy attached. 167
4.

Double Jeopardy's Limitations

While the U.S. courts write of double jeopardy protection as
absolute, in fact several significant limitations-though narrow in
scope-are present. The most prominent is the so-called "dual
sovereignty rule." Double jeopardy attaches only to prosecutions for the
same criminal act by the same jurisdiction. This means that a defendant
could be charged and .convicted of the same offense twice, as long as
both charges and convictions were not within the same jurisdiction. The
rationale behind this double jeopardy limitation is that each sovereign has
164. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1977) (holding
that the acquittal stands when the state's evidence is insufficient to establish factual guilt). That is,
of course, precisely what is being promoted in Australia and in the United Kingdom. See supra
Part liLA. The most prominent application of the altered rule in the United Kingdom came in
2006. See David Brown & Frances Gibb, Mother's Reliefas Killer Is Convicted Under Double
Jeopardy Law Refonn, TIMES OF LoNDON, Sept. 12, 2006, at 3, available at http:/tbusiness.
timesonline.co.uk/toltbusiness/law/article635850.ece.
165. See, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 ( 1984); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 797 (1969).
166. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
167. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 ("' [A]cquittal' is not to be controlled by the
form of the judge's action.... Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge,
whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged." (citation omitted)); see also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 4 76 U.S.
140, 145 (1986) ("[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfmding proceedings going to
guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause."). For double jeopardy purposes, the
Court has also found an "implied acquittal" to be of constitutional significance. When a
defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense, that is an implied acquittal of the greater
charge, and, thus, subsequent prosecution of the greater charge is barred by double jeopardy.
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,421 (1980); see a/so Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)
(holding petitioner could not be retried for murder having been convicted of manslaughter).
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its own laws, and thus, has a right to prosecute under its laws. Therefore,
the previously discussed protections from reprosecution after acquittal
and against multiple punishments would not apply with multiple
prosecutions by different sovereigns. The following are all viewed as
168
169
separate sovereigns: federal and a state, two states, or the military
170
and a state.
Reprosecution is allowed under double jeopardy when the
defendant has moved for a mistrial. On the other hand, actions on the
part of the prosecution resulting in a mistrial will nearly always restrict
reprosecution. One exception to the bar on reprosecution falls within the
category of manifest necessity. 171 The theory is that "the defendant's
interest in proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and
equally legitimate demand for public justice."172 A "high degree" of
necessity must be present. 173 Most commonly, as noted above, the
exception has been applied in cases involving hung juries. 174 The
government claim of no fault in creating the necessity for a new trial is
carefully scrutinized. "[T]he prosecutor must shoulder the burden of
justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar." 175

***

The Double Jeopardy Clause is seen as an extremely important
protection in the United States. There are certain complexities associated
with the right as well as some exceptions and limitations; however, the
United States Constitution maintains strictly the protection the Clause
affords. The United States has, historically and recently, offered a
stringent guarantee, and has never seriously challenged the need for the

168. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 192 (1959).
169. Heath v.Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,88 (1985).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Ragan!, 56 M.J. 852, 856 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2002). A
tribal court is an additional, separate sovereign. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004)
(holding that an Indian tribal court can prosecute nonmembers who have been previously
prosecuted elsewhere, and that prosecution will not amount to an exercise offederal power).
171. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
172. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973) (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684
(1949)).
173. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978) ("'[N]ecessity' cannot be
interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees
of necessity and we require a 'high degree' before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.").
174. See United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1976)(holding that the government
was not precluded on the double jeopardy ground from retrying defendants where the first trial
ended in a mistrial of manifest necessity because of a hung jury). See also United States v.
Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219,228 (5th Cir. 2009).
175. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505.
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basic principles. This view is consistent with the skepticism seen
elsewhere as to the power of the government to prosecute its citizens.
The Australian view, too, is consistent with what we saw earlier in several
areas such as the rule of exclusion and entrapment. Without deeply
ingrained skepticism as to the role of government in this process, leaders
in some Australian states seem willing to grant greater power to the
government to prosecute bad people more than once.

IV.

SENTENCING

A.

The Umted States
"Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our
sentences too long."
176
-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy

1.

Introduction

For decades now, the United States has punished its criminal
offenders quite severely. 177 Indeed, the sense has been that such
punishment may be appropriate when, relatively speaking, tremendous
protections are offered to defendants in the criminal justice process. 178
With one in every 131 of its citizens behind bars, 179 the United States is
176. Frank J. Murray, Supreme Court Justice Urges Shorter Sentences; Justice Kennedy
Wants' Repeal ofMandatory Sentences Aller Voting that They Are Constitutional, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 10,2003, atAl.
177. In this Part, we will generalize about the current situation in the United States, but this
approach is difficult and the reader should be cautioned that states have widely different views on
the matter, as is allowed by the U.S. system of federalism. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GoRDON
HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 137, 137 (1991). The authors there correctly note that
the punishment systems in the fifty states and U.S. federal system are so different from one
another that they could be viewed as fifty-one different countries. Id
Moreover, in this Article, we will not discuss capital punishment. At this point, we can add
very little to the intense debate in the United States and the settled question in Australia. Capital
punishment was banned in Australia in 1973. For history in this area and international
comparisons, see generally Paul Marcus, Capital Punishment in the United States and Beyond, 31
MELB. U. L. REv. 837 (2007). See also Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty
(2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf(stating that currently in the United States,
the numbers of capital prosecutions, death sentences, and executions are much lower than in the
past).
178. See generally Marcus & Waye, supra note 1.
179. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Growth in Prison
and Jail Populations Slowing: 16 States Report Declines in the Number of Prisoners (Mar. 31,
2009) (reflecting information as of June 30, 2008). For an excellent overview of the current
issues in the United States regarding sentencing, see Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter's Study: The
Question of Parole Release Authority, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 1 (Discussion Draft
No. 2, 2009). See also Dahlia Lithwick, Our Real Prison Problem; My Are We So Womed
About Gitmo?, NEWSWEEK, June 15,2009, at 28.
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currently facing an incarceration crisis of epic proportions. Since the
determinate sentencing movement of the 1970s, the number of
individuals incarcerated in the United States has increased seven-fold,
with current prison and jail populations reaching 2.3 million. 180 With
about just 5% of the world's population, the United States has 25% of the
world's reported prisoners. 181 As of 2008, the United States had the
highest known incarceration rate in the world with 762 inmates per
100,000 people. 182 Federal, state, and local spending on prisons and jails
currently totals more than $68 billion a year. 183 This incarceration crisis
has disproportionally impacted racial minorities, with 40% of the
individuals in prisons and jails being African American and 20% being
Hispanic. 184 Furthermore, it has disrupted families and communities
across the nation, leaving some 1. 7 million children with a parent behind
bars in 2007. 185
2.

History of Sentencing in the United States

In colonial times, the English imposed determinate, or fixed,
sentences for felony offenses. 186 This practice of determinate sentencing
left little discretion to trial court judges-once a jury found a defendant
guilty of a felony beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence for the

180. See The Sentencing Project, Facts About Prisons and Prisoners (Apr. 2009),
http://sentencing project.org/doc/publications/inc_factsaboutprison.pdf.
181. Jim Webb, J.WJy We Must Fix Our Prisons, PARADE, Mar. 29, 2009, at 4, available at
http://www.parade.com/news/2009/03/why-we-must-fix-our-prisons.html.
In 1984, Japan had a population half the size of ours and was incarcerating 40,000
sentenced offenders, compared with 580,000 in the United States. As shocking as that
disparity was, the difference between the countries now is even more astounding-and
profoundly disturbing. Since then, Japan's prison population has not quite doubled to
71,000, while ours has quadrupled to 2.3 million.
Id See generally MaryBeth Lipp, A New Perspective on the "War on Drugs'~· Comparing the
Consequences ofSentencing Policies in the United States and England, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 979
(2004).
182. Compare HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES 2 tbl.l (Mar. 2009) (reflecting statistics as of
midyear 2008), with Webb, supra note 181, at 4 (reporting a slightly lower rate of incarceration756 inmates per 100,000 residents).
183. See Webb, supra note 181, at4.
184. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180.
185. SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991-2007, at 2 (2009), available athttp://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf.
186. Susan R. Klein, The Return ofFederal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39
VAL. U. L. REv. 693, 693 (2005).
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defendant's crime was set. 187 In this way, a felony defendant "knew from
the face of the charging instrument precisely what sentence she would
receive if convicted."' 88
The English colonial practice of determinate sentencing was not,
however, readily embraced by the Americans, who began criticizing the
practice because it did not allow for individualized determinations of
punishment. 189 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Congress and
the states had repealed their determinate sentences as part of a continued
trend away from fixed sentencing and towards legislatively prescribed
ranges for imprisonment, giving judges increased sentencing
190
"[A]ppellate review of sentencing was virtually nondiscretion.
existent"'9' during this time period, allowing judges an "enormous and
essentially unbridled authority to impose a sentence anywhere within the
legislatively prescribed range." 192
During the mid-nineteenth century, Americans began to view
imprisonment as a means of both moral reform193 and penance.' 94 Prisons
became known as "penitentiaries" and states expended a considerable
amount of money on their construction. 195 However, by 1865, "the
reformatory ideals of the penitentiary had largely given way to the
practical realities of modem imprisonment, with overcrowding and
brutality among prisoners and staff a grim reality."' 96 About one hundred
years ago, the "rehabilitation model" came into favor. 197 "Prisons were
re-conceptualized from places of penance and punishment to institutions
for the transformation of offenders into law-abiding citizens." 198 Then, in
1910, the first federal prisoners were paroled, and by 1930 the Board of
Parole, later known as the United States Parole Commission, was
187. Id According to Professor Klein, "[t]he judicial role was largely a ministerial oneimpose that sentence mandated by the jury verdict." Id
188. Id at 696. The sentence ordered was usually ''the death penalty or a fme [that] varied
according to the value of the property stolen." Id Nonfelony offenses were usually not punished
by imprisonment, but rather by "whipping, fines, banishment, and public humiliations, such as
time in the stocks." PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIITEEN YEARS OF
GUIDELINES SENTENCING 41 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf.
189. Klein, supra note 186, at 696.
190. /dat697.
191. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The US. Sentencing Commissions
Troubling Silence About the Purposes ofPunishmen~ 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. I 043, I 050 (2003).
192. Klein, supra note 186, at 697.
193. HOFERET AL., supra note 188, at 41.
194. Id at 1.
195. Id at 41. To be sure, Europeans such as Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United
States with the specific purpose of studying these penitentiaries. Id
196. Id
197. Id at I; Klein, supra note 186, at 698.
198. HOFER ET AL., supra note 188, at 1.
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established. 199 Parole boards throughout the nation began to consider a
prisoner's behavior and progress towards rehabilitation in deciding when
his/her sentence would end. 200 The flexibility of indeterminate sentencing
allowed for this personally tailored approach to incarceration.
Both the practice of indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitation
model were in place for much of the twentieth century. 201 Belief in the
efficacy of the rehabilitative model, however, began to falter by the late
1970s.202 This was largely due to a "growing mistrust of a 'therapeutic
state"' coupled with the fact that there was no "strong evidence for the
effectiveness of correctional treatment programs."203 Plus, the respective
rates of crime and recidivism were high. 204 At the same time, concerns
about the practice of indeterminate sentencing were growing. 205 Many
Americans were troubled by the amount of discretion given to judges
under the indeterminate system and felt that it resulted in ''unwarranted
disparities [in the sentences] for similarly situated defendants." 206
Another major criticism of indeterminate sentencing was that it resulted
in punishments that were overly lenient. 207 Reformers began to advocate
for punishments that were uniform and proportional to the severity of the
offense. 208 The focus was no longer on the offender's potential for
rehabilitation, but rather on the danger posed to the community. 209
In the midst of this reform, several states passed mandatory
minimum laws. 210 The key reform against indeterminate sentencing was
199. U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at
http://www. usdoj .gov/uspc/history. pdf
200. HOFERET AL., supmnote 188, at 41-42.
201. Rappaport, supmnote 191, at 1049-50.
202. HOFERET AL., supmnote 188, at 2.
203. Id at2.
204. David Yellen, Saving Fedeml Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and
Booker, 50 VILL. L. REv. 163, 165 (2005).
205. HOFER ET AL., supm note 188, at 2, 42; Klein, supm note 186, at 699; Rappaport,
supmnote 191, at 1050-53.
206. Klein, supm note 186, at 699. Critics pointed to evidence that the disparities were
attributable to factors like "geography, race, gender, socio-economic status, and judicial
philosophy" and not to factors like criminal history, potential for rehabilitation, or the nature of
the circumstances surrounding the crime. Id; see also Rappaport, supm note 191, at I 050-52.
207. HOFERET AL., supmnote 188, at 42; Rappaport, supmnote 191, at 1052-53.
208. HOFERETAL.,supmnote 188,at42.
209. Id The United States was certainly not the only nation to have taken this approach
during this period. See Stephan Terblanche & Geraldine Mackenzie, Mandatory Sentences in
SouthA/iica: Lessons for Australia?, 41 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRiMINOLOGY 402,406-07 (2008).
210. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDAJDRY MINIMuMS FOUND. (FAMMF), HISTORY OF
MANDATORY SENTENCES I (2005), http://www.farnm.org/Repository/Fi!es/Updated%20short"/o20
HISTORY.pdf. For example, New York enacted its famous Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973. Id
These laws established mandatory minimum fifteen year sentences for certain drug offenses. Id
Shortly thereafter, in 1978, Michigan passed its 650 Lifer Law which imposed a mandatory
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the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).211 It made some
drastic changes to the federal sentencing system in the United States,
creating an expert agency called the United States Sentencing
Commission (U.S.S.C.). 212 It called upon the new agency to draft federal
sentencing guidelines. 213 Unsurprisingly, one of the central goals of the
SRA was to "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct." 214 The U.S.S.C. issued its federal sentencing
guidelines in 1987.215 The guidelines set up a determinate sentencing
system under which a criminal offender's sentence was fixed based upon
a variety offactors. 216 Furthermore, under the SRA, a court was required
to follow the sentencing guidelines unless there was "an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission."217
In addition to creating the U.S.S.C., the SRA also abolished the
Federal Parole Commission. This was seen by many as being the "final
minimwn life sentence without parole for anyone found with 650 grams of certain kinds of drugs
like cocaine and heroin. Id; see Drug Policy Alliance Network, Rockefeller Drug Laws,
http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate/newyork/rockefellerd/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2010); Yellen,
supra note 204, at 167 ("[I]n 1980, Minnesota became the first state to promulgate sentencing
guidelines, followed by Pennsylvania in 1982 and Washington in 1984 .").
211. 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-998 (2006).
212. Id § 991.
213. Id § 994.
214. Id § 991(b)(1)(B). The four central purposes of punishment identified by the SRA
were also unsurprising given the shift away from the rehabilitation model and the concerns of
reformers about the leniency of indeterminate sentencing. These purposes, listed in the SRA,
were:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
215. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission
I (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general!USSCoverview.pdf.
216. These guidelines, contained in the Federal Sentencing Manual, established a
determinate sentence (within a 25% discretionary range) for each offender according to the
offense of conviction, offender characteristics, circwnstances surrounding the offense, and
relevant conduct not accounted for by the indictment. Unlike the determinate sentencing system
in place in England and very early American colonial times, where all essential elements
necessary to a particular determinate sentence were determined by a jury, many of the facts
mandating a particular enhanced sentence under the Guidelines were found by the judge using a
preponderance of the evidence standard. The role of the judge here was later sharply curtailed by
the Supreme Court. See infia text accompanying notes 224-225.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); seeHOFERET AL., supra note 188, at 7.
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nail in the coffin of federal indeterminate sentencing."218 It meant that
"[a]bsent an appellate reversal or a presidential pardon, the fixed
sentence imposed by the district judge pursuant to the guidelines would
be served, in full, by the offender."219 The SRA also added harsher
mandatory minimums to many sections of the United States Code. 220 The
net effect of the SRA was a dramatic reduction in judicial discretion
when it came to federal sentencing decisions. This approach was widely
followed in many states. 221
In the years following the passage of the SRA, both Congress and
state legislatures began passing mandatory minimum laws, and by 1994
all fifty states and the District of Columbia had versions of such laws. 222
The 1990s also saw a proliferation of so-called three-strikes laws, with
nearly half of all states enacting such laws between 1993 and 1995.223
Soon thereafter, an important line of Supreme Court cases indicated that
enhancement of a sentence under the guidelines beyond the maximum
amount based upon facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury
violated the United States Constitution, specifically the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. 224 The Court also held that the
sentencing guidelines were advisory, not mandatory. 225 Taken together,
these decisions were properly viewed as a victory against strictly
determinate sentencing and a major win in the battle to reclaim judicial
discretion.
218. Klein,supmnote 186,at701.
219. Id at 702.
220. Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 445-46 (1992) (citing
amendments to the U.S.S.G.).
221. FAMMF, supmnote 210.
222. David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role ofProsecutorial Discretion
Under Mandatory Minimwn Sentencing, 48 J.L. & EcON. 591, 591 (2005).
223. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89 (2001).
The laws vary, but most call for life sentences without the possibility of release for at
least 25 years upon a third conviction of a serious violent crime. The crimes include
murder, rape, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and sexual abuse. A
few states include additional crimes, most commonly firearm violations, burglary of
occupied dwellings, and simple robbery. The rationale for the laws is that the longer
prison terms reduce crime by deterring and incapacitating the most active and
dangerous criminals.
Jd at 89-90 (footnotes omitted).
224. See United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprenmand Blake.(yapplied to state
sentencing guidelines. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Bookerhowever,
made it clear that the holdings were applicable under the federal sentencing guidelines as well.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
225. Booker, 543 U.S. at245.
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With prison populations soaring, states began to enact significant
reforms against determinate sentencing during this time period. 226 And,
as noted below, states began a return to the expansion of treatment
programs, the reform of parole and probation systems, and establishment
of alternatives to imprisonment for nonviolent offenders. 227
3.

Impact of Severe Sentencing

Much has been written about the consequences of the determinate
sentencing movement and harsh punishments of the past decades. 228 One
of the most frequently cited consequences of determinate sentencing is
the high rate at which American citizens are incarcerated. 229 This high
incarceration rate has greatly impacted the American economy at the
226. See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CHANGING DIRECTION?: STATE
SENTENCING REFORMS 2004-2006, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/sentencingreforrnforweb.pdf; see also FAMMF, supra note 210.
Michigan repealed its 650-lifer laws in 1998 and passed sweeping reforms of its mandatory
minimum laws in 2002, New York revised its Rockefeller Drug Laws in 2004, and California
passed a proposition mandating treatment, instead of imprisonment, for nonviolent first and
second drug offenders in 2000. FAMMF, supra note 210. Both California and New York are in
the middle of serious reviews of their criminal justice systems, particularly focusing on
sentencing and imprisonment. See Jeremy W Peters, Albany Reaches Deal To Repeal '70s Drug
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at AI; California May Have To Cut Prison Population by 40
Percent (Feb. I 0, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRlME/02/l 0/california.prisons/. Changes
will need to be substantial in order to make much of an impact. N.Y. Times Opinionator Blog,
California Will Survive Its Crackup, http:/legan.blogs.nytimes.corn/2009/05/20/California-willsurvive-its-crackup/ (May 20, 2009, 22:00 EST) (stating that California has 750,000 people in
prison or jail, or on parole or probation). The most recent development in California is a federal
court order mandating the release of 40,000 state prisoners because of an unconstitutional health
system in the prisons. Solomon Moore, Califol711a Prisons Must Cut Inmate Population, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, atA9.
The debate over sentencing has spilled over into serious discussions of other significant
aspects of the criminal justice system in the United States. For striking examples of this in media
coverage, see Steven B. Duke, Drugs: To Legalize or Not, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2009, at I;
Jennifer Steinhauer, To Cut Costs, States Relax Hard Line on Prison Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2009, at AI; Editorial, A Sensible Call for Sentencing Refonn: Virgima's Junior Senator
Insists on Taking an Honest Look at the High Cost of the War on Drugs, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct.
13, 2008, at B8; Editorial, Go After the Real Problem, DAILY PREss (Va.), Mar. 31, 2009, at C5,
available at http://articles.dailypress.com/2009-03-31/news/0903300070_l_prison-refonn-fourprisoners-prison-system; Editorial, Reviewing Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at
A28.
227. See inffa Part V.
228. See, e.g., Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: How Poor
Women ofColor and Children are Affected by Sentencing Gwdelines and Mandatory Minimums,
47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 285 (2007); Editorial, The 'War on Drugs' Is Over, May 16, 2009, at
A28; MARc MAIJER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE
WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY (2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf.
229. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear, The Effects ofHigh Imprisonment Rates on Communities, in
37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 97, 97-98 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008).
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federal, state, and local levels; American families and communities; and
the entire democratic system.
With 1 in every 131 Americans incarcerated in a prison or a jail,230 it
is clear that the increase in the incarceration rate has not been a gradual
one rising slowly throughout the twentieth century. It has skyrocketed to
remarkable levels since the determinate sentencing movement of the
1970s.231 In fact, from 1970 to the middle of 2008, the number of
individuals incarcerated in federal and state prisons increased by almost
seven-fold, 232 and from 1980 to 2007 the number of incarcerated drug
offenders in federal, state, and local prisons/jails increased by 1200%.233
As would be expected given the prevalence of mandatory minimums for
drug and other nonviolent offenses, state prisons are now populated with
low-level offenders-in 2004, 82% of the individuals sentenced to state
prisons were nonviolent offenders, with 34% of them convicted for drug
offenses and 29% for property offenses. 234
The incarceration crisis has not impacted the U.S. population
equally, however. According to The Sentencing Project, "Black males
have a 32% chance of serving time in prison at some point in their lives"
and "[h]ispanic males have a 17% chance"-in sharp contrast with white
males who have a 6% chance. 235 With respect to drug offences, AfricanAmericans make up "37% of those arrested on drug charges[,] 59% of
those convicted," and 74% of those sentenced to prison. 236 AfricanAmericans constitute about 14% of the nation's monthly drug users. 237

230. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 179.
231. Jim Webb, National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009: The Scope of the
Problem, http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/SlidesCrimina!JusticeBill.pdf (last
visited Jan. 6, 2010) (PowerPoint presentation); HOFERET AL., supra note 188, at 39.
232. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180; HOFER ET AL., supra note 188, at 39.
233. Webb, supra note 231.
234. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180 (finding in 2007 that 47.5% of all drug arrests
in the United States were for marijuana offenses); Webb, supra note 181. Furthermore, of those
serving out drug offenses in state prisons, 60% of offenders were nonviolent and did not have a
significant history of selling drugs. Id
235. The Sentencing Project, supra note 180.
236. Webb, supra note 231.
237. Id; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Testimony of Charles Ogletree: Discdminatory
Impact of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in the United States, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 273, 275
(2006). The scope of the incarceration crisis and its discriminatory impact become even larger,
however, when the number of individuals on parole and probation is factored in. In 2008,
approximately five million Americans were on parole, probation, or were receiving some other
community sanction. Webb, supra note 231. Added together with the 2.3 million Americans
incarcerated in federal and state prisons and in local jails, the total becomes 7.3 million
Americans in the corrections system. Id
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Economic Impact

As would be expected, the costs of incarcerating and overseeing
millions of people are staggeringly high. Almost $70 billion238 is spent
per year at the federal, state, and local levels, making the high rates of
incarceration a substantial contributor to many states' budget problems. 239
With one of the highest incarceration rates in the nation, California
is the clearest example of a state whose budget has been greatly affected
by the costs of corrections. According to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, the average yearly cost per inmate in
2008 and 2009-in nonconstruction costs-was $35,587 and per parolee
was $4338. 240 The proposed 2009-2010 California state budget for
corrections is $9.9 billion (7.3% ofthe total expenditures for the state). 241
It is not the only state in trouble. In Florida, the average yearly cost per
inmate in fiscal year 2007-2008 was $20,108 or about $55.09 per day 42
(74% on operations, 24% on health services, and 2% on education).243
Florida's corrections budget totaled more than $2 billion (8.5% of the
state general revenue budget). 244 Mississippi, a state with the second
highest imprisonment rate for sentenced prisoners, spent an average daily
amount of $49.13 per inmate in the 2008 fiscal year. 245

238. See Webb, supra note 181, at 4.
239. Solomon Moore, In US. Prison Spending Outpaces All But Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2009, atA13.
240. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., PRESENTATION TO
SENATE BUDGET SUBCOMMmEE No. 4 ON STATE ADMINISTRATION 4 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2009/CDCR_ 03_19_09 .pdf.
241. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, STATE OF CAL., GoVERNOR'S BUDGET SUMMARY 200910, at 13 fig.SUM-07 (Jan. 9, 2009), available athttp://www.dof.ca.gov/budgetlhistoricaV2009l 0/governors/summary/documents/FullBudgetSummary.pdf; see also Joan Peters ilia, California s
Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, in 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEw OF
RESEARCH, supra note 229, at 207, 222 ("The California prison system is incredibly
expensive. . . . California has continuously shifted resources toward prisons and away from other
areas. Between 1984 and 2006, overall state expenditures increased 294 percent but expenditures
for adult corrections increased 1,094 percent. Expenditures for social services increased 182
percent; health services, 371 percent; and mental health services, 241 percent.").
California expects a $42 billion deficit. California Budget Crisis Jeopardizes 20,000 Jobs (Feb.
17, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02117/Califomia.budget.crisis/index.html.
242. Fla. Dep't of Corr., Cost of Imprisonment (June 2009), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/
statsbrief/cost.html.
243. FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., BUDGET SUMMARY (FY 2007-08), available at http://www.dc.
state.fl.us/pub/annuaV0708/budget.html.
244. Fla. Dep't ofCorr., supra note 242.
245. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & EXPENDITURE REVIEW
(PEER), MISS. DEP'T OF CORR., MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' FY 2008 COST PER
INMATE DAY 4 (Dec. 9, 2008), available athttp://www.peer.state.ms.us/reports/rpt517.pdf.
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Societal Impact

The high incarceration rate is not just an economic problem, it is a
daily reality for families and communities across the nation. In 2007,
over half (52%) of all incarcerated men and women were parents, leaving
246
a total of 1.7 million children nationwide with a parent in prison. The
number of incarcerated mothers skyrocketed from 1991 to 2007,
increasing by 122% during that time period. 247 The number of
248
incarcerated fathers increased by 76% during the same time period.
Communities are also greatly affected by high incarceration rates.
Social networks are disrupted when adults belonging to the community
cycle in and out of prison. 249 Incarceration often causes marital
relationships to deteriorate and results in an increased number of single
parents and female-headed households. 250 In addition, with large
numbers of males being incarcerated, the gender ratios of communities
are altered, which in turn can have a negative impact on community
health. 251
4.

Recent Developments

Since 2000, most U.S. states have enacted some measures to combat
the rising prison population and the costs, economic and otherwise,
associated with it. 252 The recent economic crisis has "increased the
urgency" of resolving the incarceration cost problems. 253 In an attempt to

246. SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991-2007, at 2 (2009), available athttp://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf (reporting that the number of
children with an incarcerated parent has increased 82% since 1991 ).
247. /d
248. Id The impact on a child with an incarcerated parent can be substantial. Such
children are often raised by a relative or placed in foster care, especially if the mother is the one
incarcerated. Id at 1. Children frequently lose contact with their incarcerated parent. Id In
2004, for example, 59% of parents incarcerated in state prisons and 45% of those incarcerated in
federal prisons said they were never visited by their children. Id at 2. In addition to losing
contact with their incarcerated parent, these children are "more likely to drop out of school,
engage in delinquency, and subsequently be incarcerated themselves." Id at 1.
249. Clear, supra note 229, at 106-07.
250. Seeidat111-12.
251. /dat113-14.
252. See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2008:
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/sl_statesentencingreport2008.pdf.
253. Id; see also Steinhauer, supra note 226. A New liJik Tiineseditorial pointed out that
"[h]ard-pressed states and localities that reduce prison costs will have more money to help the
unemployed, avert layoffs of teachers and police officers, and keep hospitals operating."
Reviewing Criminal Justice, supra note 226.
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save money, some states are closing prisons. 254 To cut back on the
number of individuals in prisons, other states began sanctioning parole
violators with community service instead of jail time or enhancing
credits toward release. 255
There is serious discussion on reform of the determinate sentencing
practice at the national level. Last year several U.S. senators proposed
the National Criminal Justice Commission Act of2009. 256 The Act would
create a commission "charged with undertaking an 18-month, top-tobottom review of [the] entire criminal justice system."257 The task of the
Commission would be "to propose concrete, wide-ranging reforms
designed to [responsibly] reduce the overall incarceration rate; improve
federal and local responses to international and domestic gang
violence; ... restructure [the] approach to drug policy; improve the
treatment of mental illness; improve prison administration; and establish
a system for reintegrating ex-offenders.'ms The Act currently has strong
support from the Senate leadership and the backing of the Obama
Administration. 259

***

In the United States, we have seen remarkable changes in our
sentencing patterns over the past years. With strong constitutional
protections for those convicted of crimes, Americans were not reluctant
to get tough on crime, choosing to "[l]ock em up and throw away the
key!"260 We are, however, now seeing a dramatic rethinking of such a
harsh regime.

254. Steinhauer, supra note 226.
255. Id
256. Jim Webb, Sen. Webb's National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009 (Oct.
2009), http:l/webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/National-Criminal-Justice-Commission-Actof-2009-fact-sheet.cfm. One sponsoring senator and former prosecutor, Arlen Spector of
Pennsylvania, stated the matter succinctly: "We call it a correctional system, but we all know it
doesn't correct." Bill Sizemore, Webb Takes on Pnson System in "Crisis, "VA. PILar, June 13,
2009, at A8. There appears also to be support for change from the general public. SeeTHE2009
CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 54 (Nov. 5, 2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject.
org/manage/file/62.pdf (80% of Americans favor community service for nonviolent offenders).
257. Webb, supra note 256.
258. Id
259. Id
260. Briane Dumaine, New ~apons in the Crime War, FoimJNE, June 3, 1991, available
at http://money.cnn.corn/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/ 1991/06/03/7 5076/index.htm.
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Australia

Australian sentencing is largely entrusted to judicial discretion.
This is in contrast to the position in the United States, where unstructured
judicial discretion in sentencing has been rejected in favor of executive
and legislative constraints perceived to more closely align sentencing
with community expectations. In Australia there is a strong view that
individual judges, and not the legislature, should own the sentencing
process.261 Mandatory sentences and mandatory sentencing guidelines
are therefore the exception, rather than the rule. 262
Nonetheless, the public role in sentencing in Australia is greater
than it has ever been 263 and, despite legislative exhortations that
imprisonment should be a last resort, 264 increasingly punitive sentencing
is a common feature of the Australian criminal justice system.265 Even so,
Australian incarceration rates remain well below those in the United
States. In 2007 and 2008, the national rate of imprisonment was 162.6
prisoners per 100,000 Australian adults, 266 whereas the noncustodial
sentence rate was 337.5 offenders per 100,000 Australian adults. 267 This
compares with an incarceration rate of 976 per 100,000 adults in the
261. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATIERS I 78 ( 1996); see also GERALDINE MACKENZIE,
HOW JUDGES SENTENCE 43 (2005).
262. See, e.g., Criminal Code Act, 1913, § 401(4)(a) (W. Austl.) (imposing a minimum
sentence of twelve months imprisonment for repeat offences of burglary); see also Crimes
(Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, pt. 4, div. lA (N.S.W.) (imposing standard nonparole periods
for particular crimes). Just this past year, in August 2009, Western Australia implemented
mandatory sentencing for assaulting police officers. Criminal Code Amendment Bill, 2008, § 4
(W.Austl.).
263. See KAREN GELB, VIer. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS:
PUBLIC OPINION VERSUS PuBLIC JUDGMENT ABOUT SENTENCING, at v-vi (2006); KAREN GELB,
VICT. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MORE MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 5 (2008) [hereinafter
GELB, MORE MYTHS].
264. See, e.g., Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, § 5(1) (N.S.W.); Sentencing Act,
1991, § 5(2E) (Viet.); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act, 1988, § II (S. Austl.); Penalties and
Sentences Act, 1992, § 9(2)(a)(i) (Queens!.); Sentencing Act, 1995, § 6(4) (W. Austl.). Note,
however, that in Queensland, the principle of last resort has been abolished for offences involving
threatened or actual violence or where harm is inflicted on a victim. Penalties and Sentences Act,
1992, § 9(3) (Queens!.).
265. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. For example, in 2004 the Australian
Bureau of Statistics reported that in the previous ten years Australia's prison population grew by
40% whereas Australia's general population only increased by 15% during the same time. Press
Release, Austl. Bureau of Statistics, Population Increased by 40% over Past I 0 Years (Dec. 23,
2004), http://www.abs.gov.au.AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf!PreviousProducts/4517.0Media%20Releani
2004?opendocument&tabname=surnmary&prodno=4517.0&issue=2004&num=view=. Between
2004 and 2008, imprisonment rates continued to climb. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4517.0
PRISONERS IN AUSTRALIA 16 (2008) [hereinafter PRISONERS].
266. STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF GOV'T SERV. PROVISION, PRODUCTIVITY
COMM'N, REPORT ON GoVERNMENT SERVICES 2009, at 8.5 (2009) [hereinafter STEERING COMM.].
267. Id at 8.9.
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United States, 129 per 100,000 adults in Canada, 167 per 100,000 adults
in England, and 230 per 100,000 adults in New Zealand. 268 Based on
these figures, the United States is clearly the outlier and Australia sits
comfortably within the range of incarceration rates imposed by
comparable common law jurisdictions. Interestingly, however, one
Australian state, the Northern Territory, has an imprisonment rate of 697
per 100,000 adults, 269 which is more analogous to the United States'
incarceration rate. The reasons proffered for the divergence between the
Northern Territory and other Australian states relate to the larger number
of socially disadvantaged indigenous people living in remote areas
distant from supportive correctional services, as well as a lack of
rehabilitative programs provided to prisoners.270 Less convincingly, the
Northern Territory has also explained that as a result of a smaller
population and smaller numbers of prisoners, minor increases in prison
populations can result in significant changes in incarceration rates. 271
Average imprisonment terms are also generally shorter in Australia.
Excluding prisoners with indeterminate, life, and periodic detention
sentences, the median aggregate sentence length for sentenced prisoners
in 2008 was approximately three years. 272 Only 5% of prisoners were
serving a life term or other indeterminate sentence, whereas 58% of
Australian prisoners were serving less than five years of jail time. 273 By
comparison, prison sentences in state courts (excluding life sentences) in
the United States averaged almost five years. 274
As in the United States, incarceration rates vary disproportionately
for certain segments of the population. In Australia, between 2007 and
268. Trends in the Use of Full-Time lmprisonmen~ SENTENCING TRENDS & ISSUES
(Judicial Comm'n of N.S.W., Sydney, Austl.), Nov. 2007, at 1, 3 fig.2; see supra text
accompanying note 182.
269. AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 4512.0 CORRECTIVE SERVICES 4 (Mar. Quarter 2009).
270. See STEERING COMM., supra note 266, at 8.40. Although the Northern Territory
adopted mandatory sentencing for property offences between 1997 and 2001, following its repeal
on the basis that the sentences did not act as an effective deterrent, incarceration rates have
continued to escalate. See OFFICE OF CRIME PREVENTION, N. TERR., MANDATORY SENTENCING
FOR ADULT PROPERTY OFFENDERS: THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXPERIENCE 2, 13 (2003), available
at
http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/policycoordldocuments/statistics/mandatory_sentencing_nt_experien
ce_2003120l.pdf.
271. STEERING COMM., supra note 266, at 8.4. This reason is not particularly convincing
because incarceration rates in the Northern Territory have been substantially higher than other
Australian states for some time. See OFFICE OF CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 270, at 7.
272. See PRISONERS, supra note 265, at 30.
273. Id
274. U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004,
tb1.1.3, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/scsctU4_HC.cfm (last visited Jan. 14,
2010).
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2008, the "standardised imprisonment rate per 100,000 Indigenous
adults ... was 1630.4 compared with a corresponding rate of 128.2 for
non-Indigenous prisoners."275 However, this does not necessarily mean
that sentencing of indigenous offenders in Australia is racially biased.
The national rate of community-based corrections, that is, noncustodial
sentences for the same period, "was 3288.2 per 100,000 Indigenous
adults compared with 271.1 for non-Indigenous offenders," suggesting
higher rates of indigenous participation in crime. 276 Recent studies
examining indigenous disparity in sentencing confirm that legal variables
including criminal antecedents, current crime seriousness, and breach of
noncustodial sanctions are determinative, rather than racial profile. 277
Indeed, one study found that indigeneity was more likely to mitigate
sentence severity in jurisdictions where the judiciary recognizes the
destructive impact of colonialization upon traditional indigenous
societies and the severe socio-economic disadvantage it continues to
produce.278
Nevertheless, the failure of the current sentencing regime to redress
recidivism and mitigate the impact of unacceptably high rates of
incarceration upon the indigenous community has led to experimentation
with other approaches incorporating restorative justice elements. These
are discussed infTa Part V.
Judicial discretion in Australian sentencing is not completely
unconstrained. All Australian jurisdictions have implemented sentencing
legislation that specifies sentencing purposes and sets out relevant factors
and principles that should be applied in the sentencing process. 279
Identified purposes of sentencing include punishment, rehabilitation,
general and specific deterrence, protection of the community,
denunciation, and restoring relations between the victim, the community,

275. STEERINGCOMM., supra note 266, at 8.7.
276. Id at 8.10.
277. Lucy Snowball & Don Weatherburn, Does Racial Bias in Sentencing Contribute to
Indigenous Overrepresentation in Prison?, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIM. 272, 286-87 (2007).
278. Samantha Jeffries & Christine Bond, Does Indigeneity Matter? Sentencing
Indigenous Offenders in South Australia's Higher Courts 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIM. 47, 64-65
(2009). Not all Australian jurisdictions adopt this approach. Other jurisdictions have downplayed
indigeneity as a ground for leniency, especially where the offender lives in a modern, urban
environment. SeeR v. Fuller-Cust [2002] V.S.C.A. 168, paras. 58-63; R v. Ceissman (2001) 160
F.L.R. 252, 257; Crawford v. Laverty (2008) A.C.T.S.C. 107, paras. 18-25.
279. Crimes Act, 1914, pt. IB, div. 2 (Austl.); Crimes (Sentencing Act), 2005, pt. 4(1),
§§ 33-34 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, § 4 (N.S.W); Criminal
Law (Sentencing) Act, 1988, § 2(10) (S. Austl.); Sentencing Act, 2008, Pt. 2 (N. Terr.); Penalties
and Sentences Act, 1992, § 9 (Queens!.); Sentencing Act, 1997, § 3 (Tas.); Sentencing Act, 1995,
§ 6 (W. Austl.); Sentencing Act, 1991, § 5 (Viet.).
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and the offender. 280 Specified factors the courts are required to take into
account include the nature and circumstances of the offence, the degree
of the offender's criminality, the victim's circumstances, the level of harm
inflicted, demonstrated remorse and/or provision of restitution, the
offender's personal circumstances, and the impact of a sentence upon the
offender's family or dependents. 281 However, there is no ranking of the
purposes or factors. Thus, no single approach to sentencing is practiced
or prescribed, and judges are free to emphasize the purposes and factors
they believe individual cases warrant. As explained in ~en v. The
Queen (No. 2)
[The sentencing purposes] are guideposts to the appropriate sentence but
sometimes they point in different directions. And so a mental abnormality
which makes an offender a danger to society when he is at large but which
diminishes his moral culpability for a particular crime is a factor which has
two countervailing effects: one which tends towards a longer custodial
282
sentence, the other towards a shorter.

The Australian approach has attracted critics voicing concerns similar to
those opposed to indeterminate sentencing in the United States during
the 1970s. Arguably, the lack of substantial constraint can lead to
incoherence and produce unjustified disparities in sentencing. 283 The
absence of data and studies supporting options that best address
deterrence, rehabilitation, and other mandated sentencing aims and
objectives from sentencing hearings also exposes Australian sentencing
practice to claims of lack of efficacy. 284 This is exemplified by the
Australian Law Reform Commission's report, Same Crime, Same
Time, 285 which, among other things, recommended the adoption of new
federal sentencing legislation in the face of apparently unequal
sentencing practices across Australian jurisdictions. 286 Even within
280. See sources cited supra note 279.
281. See sources cited supra note 279.
282. (1988) 164 C.L.R. 465, 476-77; see also Markarian v. The Queen (2005) 228 C.L.R.
357 (rejecting an atomistic, structured approach to sentencing and characterizing sentencing as a
"complex alchemy").
283. See RICHARD EDNEY & MIRK.o BAGARIC, AuSTRALIAN SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 15-16 (2007); John L. Anderson, 'Indefmite; Inhwnane, Inequitable'-The Pnnciple of
Equal Application ofthe Law and the Natural Life Sentence for Murder: A Refbrrn Agenda., 29
U. N.S.W L.J. 139, 139 (2006); ANDREW AsHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 331
(4th ed. 2005).
284. See Mirko Bagaric, Strategic (and Popular) Sentencing, 2 INT'L J. PuNISHMENT &
SENT'G 121, 126 (2006).
285. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 103, SAME CRIME, SAME TIME:
SENTENCING OF fEDERAL OFFENDERS (2006).
286. Id at 13. Interestingly, however, the legislation recommended by the Law Reform
Commission largely replicates existing Australian state legislation. In other words, judicial
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Australian jurisdictions, the recogrutlon of the potential for
individualized justice to conflict with equality before the law has led to
administrative, judicial, and legislative reforms in some jurisdictions and
287
the call for reform in others. The reforms include the establishment of
sentencing databases to record trends in the range of sentences applicable
to particular offences,288 the creation of Sentencing Councils that act as
advisory bodies to the courts and the Attorney General, 289 and the
adoption of guideline judgments by appellate courts that set penalty
tariffs for particular types of offences. 29° Consistent with United States v.
Booker,291 the latter are not binding,292 but in contrast to the United States,
the sentencing guidelines are judicially, not legislatively, generated.
Australian appellate courts have a greater capacity to review
sentencing decisions and to develop sentencing guidelines compared
with their U.S. counterparts, whose appellate sentencing jurisprudence
has been described as "almost non-existent."293 This may be viewed as a
partial justification for the rejection of indeterminate sentencing by U.S.
policy makers and its continued appeal in Australia. Review at the
behest of either the defendant or the prosecution, where both the justice
discretion is left unfettered, although the Report purports to promote greater transparency of
reasoning in the sentencing process. Cf. id at 541-42.
287. See, e.g., EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 283, at 17; Bagaric, supra note 284.
288. The utility of these databases is discussed further by N.S.W. Chief Justice J.J.
Spigelman. J.J. Spigelman, N.S.W. Chief Justice, Consistency and Sentencing, Keynote Address
to the Sentencing 2008 Conference of the National Judicial College of Australia (Feb. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.aullawlink/Supreme_Courtlll_sc.nsf/vwFiles/spigelman
080208.pdf/$file/Spigelman080208.pdf.
289. See, e.g., Victoria Sentencing Advisory Council, Welcome to the Sentencing
Advisory Council, http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2010); N.S.W.
Sentencing Council, About Us, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/Lawlink/scounciUll_scouncil.nsf/
pages/scouncil_aboutus (last visited Jan. 6, 2010); N.S.W. Judicial Comm'n, Welcome to the
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited Jan. 6,
2010) (noting that the Commission is tasked with assisting the courts to achieve consistency in
sentencing in New South Wales).
290. Guideline judgments have been adopted in New South Wales and to a limited extent
in South Australia. See Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, 1999, pt. 3, div. 4 (N.S.W.); Criminal
Law (Sentencing) Act, 1988, § 29A-2913 (S. Austl.). Victoria and Western Australia have also
enacted legislation allowing for guideline judgments. See Sentencing Act, 1991, § 6AA (Viet.);
Sentencing Act, 1995, § 143 (W. Austl.). However, Arie Freiberg and Peter Sallmann report that
appellate courts in those states have regarded guideline judgments as unduly legalistic and
contrary to the paradigm that sentencing is largely a matter of judicial discretion. Arie Freiberg &
Peter Sallmann, Courts of Appeal and Sentencing: Principles, Policy and Politics, 26 L. IN
CONTEXT 43, 56 (2008).
291. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); see supra text accompanying notes 224-225.
292. Studies by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales confirm that the guideline
judgments have been very effective in producing greater uniformity in sentencing. See
Spigelman, supra note 288, at 18-19.
293. Freiberg & Sallmann, supra note 290, at 56.
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of the individual case and the public interest in ensuring that a just
penalty is imposed can be addressed, allays the appearance of
arbitrariness that individualized sentencing might otherwise evoke. This
also provides Australian appellate courts with an opportunity to impart
authoritative guidance to sentencing judges. 294 However, others are
skeptical of appellate courts' ability to fashion sentencing standards,
noting that appellate decision making is ad hoc, confined by the facts of
the case and the arguments proffered by the parties, and itself subject to
disparate views of the members of the bench regarding the importance of
conflicting sentencing purposes and factors. 295 Moreover, despite the
adoption of sentencing guidelines by some jurisdictions, it seems that
Australian appellate courts remain deferential to the sentencing of trial
judges and are unlikely to intervene except in egregious cases. 296 Hence,
while appellate review constitutes a potential forum for the development
of sentencing policy, it may in fact be a weak mechanism for achieving
coherence and consistency and therefore of itself cannot be characterized
as a substantial explanation for the stark divergence in sentencing
outcomes observed between Australia and the United States.
One important feature of the maintenance of judicial discretion in
sentencing is that it preserves a significant role for mercy. Subjective
aspects of the offender's personal life become far more important when
sentencing is the legal and moral responsibility of a judge facing the
defendant in the courtroom. This, of course, is in contrast to having an
anonymous and attenuated legislature that is accountable to a community
whose outlook (in the absence of knowledge of the offender's particulars
and the circumstances of the offending) will largely be skewed toward
retribution. 297 Not having judicial discretion in sentencing is likely to lead
to harsher sentencing, because the focus of the sentencing judge is forced
away from individualized considerations to more publicly oriented
matters such as culpability, just desserts, and the protection of the
community. 298
294. Wong v. The Queen (2001) 207 C.L.R. 584, 10.
295. Freiberg & Sallmann, supra note 290, at 49-50.
296. See, e.g., Lowndes v. The Queen (1999) 195 C.L.R. 665, para. 15. For an outsider's
perspective on Australian appellate courts' approach to sentencing appeals, see Grant Hammond,
Sentencing: Intuitive Synthesis or Structured Discretion?, N.Z. L. REv. 211, 216 (2007).
297. GELB, MORE MYTIIS, supra note 263, at 4-5 (fmding that in the abstract, public
opinion was that sentencing was too lenient, but when provided with particular information about
the crime, the offender, and the victim, the public becomes far less punitive).
298. See, e.g., Matthew S. Crow & William Bales, Sentencing Guidelines and Focal
Concems: The Effect ofSentencing Policy as a Practical Constraint on Sentencing Decisions, 30
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 285, 286 (2006) (fmding that while the introduction of determinate sentencing
reduced disparity in sentencing linked to nonlegal variables such as the race of the offender, it
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Mandatory sentences are not only designed to produce greater
uniformity in sentencing outcomes; they are primarily designed to
restrict perceived judicial trivialization of offences, narrowing sentencing
options and increasing punitiveness. Mandatory sentencing rarely offers
much more than longer terms of imprisonment and is almost myopic in
promoting retribution and specific deterrence to the exclusion of other
sentencing aims, such as rehabilitation and general deterrence. 299
Customized, alternative forms of sentencing-for example, community
service orders, compulsory medical treatment, reparation, restorative
measures, home detention, and fines-seldom figure into mandatory
sentencing regimes. On the other hand, the maintenance of judicial
discretion in sentencing is more consistent with greater innovation in
sentencing practice. The U.S. war on drugs is an example. Because of
harsh sentences for drug offenders that, in some cases, rival sentences for
serious violent crimes, 300 the courts and prisons have become
301
overcrowded with drug users and low level drug distributors. Yet, the
market for drugs has flourished. Arguably, this has occurred because
drug policies based upon public health and harm-reduction have been
sidelined.
However, the above observations still beg the question as to why the
Australian polity retains judicial discretion, along with the less punitive
forms of sentencing it generates, and why policy makers in the United
States are seriously questioning whether mandatory sentencing and the
punitive regimes they generate are cost-effective. 302 Public opinion in
Australia regarding sentencing is very similar to public opinion in the
United States. Driven by sensational reporting in the media, the majority
of the Australian public is under the impression that crime (especially

significantly increased sentencing severity); Matthew S. Crow & Marc Gertz, Sentencing Policy
and Disparity: Guidelines and the Influence ofLegal and Democratic Subcultures, 36 J. CRIM.
JusT. 362 (2008) (examining the effects of the reintroduction of judicial discretion and finding
that nonlegal variables, such as gender and race, increased the likelihood of incarceration in a
follow up study).
299. See generally Neil Hutton, Institutional Mechanisms for Incorporating the Public, in
PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING COUNCILS AND SENTENCING POLICY 205 (Arie Freiberg & Karen
Gelb eds., 2008).
300. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2D 1.1, 1.2 (2009).
30 I. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso et a!., The War on Drugs Is a Failure, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2009; seealsoDANBAUM, SMOKEANDMIRR.ORS: THEWARONDRUGSANDTHEPOLffiCS
OF FAILURE, at xii (1996).
302. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y. Gen., Address at the 2009 ABA Convention,
available at http://www. usdoj .gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html; PEw CENTER ON THE
STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3 (2008), available at http://www.
pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/80 15PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-l-l_FORWEB.pdf.
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violent crime) is escalating even when it is stable or decreasing. They
also underestimate the harshness of existing sentencing practices and
overestimate rates of recidivism. 304 The public has little faith in the courts
or the legal system and believes that sentencing judges are out of touch
with community values. These views are reinforced by governments
quick to claim that their punitive sentencing policies are linked to falling
crime rates. As a result, the rhetoric of crime and justice is just as central
in partisan politics in Australia as it appears to be in the United States. 305
Yet at the same time, mandatory sentencing regimes are not popular
except for those covering a small range of violent crirnes. 306 They have
been condemned by Australia's Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Cornrnission307 and the Australian Law Reform Cornrnission. 308 These
regimes are lambasted as draconian when applied to low-level criminal
activity, 309 regarded as racially discriminatory in operation, 310 and in the
case of the Northern Territory government, which campaigned to
maintain mandatory sentencing, a cause of electoral failure. 311 Australians
prefer individualized sentencing in the hands of judges, even if they
perceive that judges are generally too lenient.
Australian courts also recognize that "money spent on increasing
imprisonment is not necessarily well spent (even in comparison with
303. Western Australia v. BLM (2009) 256 A.L.R. 129, para. 20 (citing DoN
WEATHERBURN, N.S.W BUREAU OF STATISTICS & CRIME RESEARCH, PuBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF
CRIME TRENDS IN NEW SOUTH WALES AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA (2004)); GELB, MORE MYTHS,
supmnote263.
304. BLM256 A.L.R. 129, para. 20.
305. See Michael Tonry, Parochialism in US. Sentencing Policy, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 48,
49 (1999).
306. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and MandiJtory Sentencing: A Review of
Intemational Findings, 30 CRJM. JusT. & BEHAV. 483, 495-99 (2003).
307. Austl. Human Rights Comm'n, Mandatory Detention Laws in Australia: An
Overview of Current Laws and Proposed Reform, http://www.hreoc.gov.au!HUMAN_RlGHTS/
children/mandatory_briefmg.htrnl (last visited Mar. 27, 2010) (finding that mandatory regimes
were contrary to Australia's international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and when applied to juvenile offenders were contrary to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child).
308. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supm note 285, at 540-42.
309. Draconian examples include a fifteen-year-old boy who hanged himself while
imprisoned for twenty-eight days for stealing stationary and breaking a window and the
sentencing of a twenty-one-year-old Aboriginal man for one year for stealing biscuits and cordial.
See Shame 2000, Bored, Unemployed, Indigenous and in Jail: Mandatory Sentencing in
Australia, http://www.unolympics.com/humanrights/mandatory.shtrnl (last visited Jan. 7, 2010).
310. AUSTL. SENATE LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE
HUMAN RIGHTS (MANDATORY SENTENCING OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS) BILL 1999, at 96 (2000).
311. LAW SOC'Y N. TERR., THE DEMISE OF MANDATORY SENTENCING-A 5 YEAR SOCIAL
EXPERIMENT 5 (2002), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committeellegcon_ctte/completed_
inquiries/2002-04/hra_mandset/submissions/sublist.htrn.
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expenditure on rehabilitation, let alone in comparison with expenditure
on matters such as policing or healthcare)."312 In 2007-2008, Australian
state governments spent $2.6 billion on prisons compared with $0.3
billion spent on community-based corrections. 313 However, Australian
law reform agencies have found no scientific evidence supporting a
causal link between increasing the severity of sentencing and reduced
crime rates. 314 In fact, the rise of alternative restorative and therapeutic
approaches in sentencing is consistent with a level of dissatisfaction with
the efficacy of ever-increasing imprisonment rates and a search for a
more judicious, evidence-based sentencing policy and practice.
V.

ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING

A.

Umted States

"After decades of supercharged incarceration rates, our bloated
prison system is straining under its own weight, and policy makers are
finally being forced to deal with the need to shrink it."315
As noted earlier, the United States currently appears to have the
highest reported incarceration rate in the world. 316 With the astronomical
economic and social consequences of over-incarceration, pressure to
resolve this problem has created a great demand for alternatives. For the
first time in decades, a serious debate-fueled by tough economic
realities and pushed by a small number of U.S. senators-is beginning to
take place across the nation. 317 Alternatives to incarceration are sought.
312. Western Australia v. BLM (2009) 526A.L.R. 129, para. 20.
313. STEERINGCOMM., supra note 266, at 8.3.
314. See, e.g., TAS. LAW REFORM lNST., SENTENCING FINAL REPORT No. II, at 2.1.25-.30
(2008).
315. Charles M. Blow, Getting Smart on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A19. For a
good overview of the developments here-focusing on the economic impetus-see Nicholas
Riccardi, Cash-Strapped States Revise Laws To Get Inmates Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009,
available atwww.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-prison-release5-2009sep05,0,57053
09.story.
316. See supra Part IY.
317. The chief proponent is Senator James Webb of Virginia, who has aggressively
promoted a broad debate on the topic. See Jeff E. Schapiro, Utebb States Case for Pnson RefOI111,
NEws & ADVANCE (Va.), Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.newsadvance.com/lna/news/state_regionall
article/webb_sates_case_for_prison_reform/15231; Reviewing Criminal Justice, supra note 226;
Editorial, Utebb Takes on Politics' Third Rail Prison Refoi111, NEWS & ADVANCE (Va.), Mar. 29,
2009, http://www.newsadvance.com/lnalnews/opinion/editorials/article!webb_takes_on_politics_
third_rail_prison_reform/14713/. Many states, however, have already instituted numerous
changes in response to dire economic situations. See Keith B. Richburg, States Seek Less Costly
Substitutes for Prison, WASH. POST, July 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdynlcontent/article/2009/17/12/AR2009071202432.html ("[M]ore than half the states and the
District [of Columbia] are trying to reduce the growth in their prison populations through
alternative sentencing and through new probation and parole procedures.").
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We focus inffa Part VAl on the development in the United States of one
of the earliest, and most widespread, alternatives: the drug court. Other
options clearly are present. Still, with an apparent consensus that the
current state of incarceration in the United States is problematic,
viewpoints significantly differ more in the United States than in Australia
on what should be done to correct that problem. The drug courts, though,
are widely heralded. 318
1.

Drug Courts

National and state drug policy, supporting longer sentences and
mandatory minimums for drug offenders as a part of the "war on drugs,"
created a huge influx of inmates: 319 80% of adults incarcerated for
felonies were arrested on drug offenses, were under the influence of
drugs at the time of their offense, committed a crime to support a drug
habit, and/or were regular drug or alcohol users at arrese 20 Unfortunately,
incarceration has proved to do little to solve the problem of substance
abuse for offenders. Nearly 70% of drug abusing offenders are
rearrested within three years following release, with 41% being
rearrested. on a drug offense in particular. 321 Increasingly, critics assert
that substantial prison sentences represent the most expensive and least
successful response to drug crimes with a cost that is incredibly high. 322
Due to the significant effect of drugs and substance abuse on the penal

318. One important development occurring in recent years concerns pretrial diversion
programs. This area is not included for discussion here, as it is an alternative to prosecution,
rather than an alternative to traditional sentencing options. These programs "divert certain
offenders from traditional criminal justice processing into a program of supervision and services."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATToRNEY'S MANuAL § 9-22.0 I 0, available at http://www.
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 201 0).
For an interesting state program, see Georgia's version, detailed inS. 412, 1999-2000 Sess. (Ga.
2000).
319. See Mae C. Quinn, J.Wiose Team Am I on Anyw.~y? Musings of a Public Defender
About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 41-42 (2000)
(discussing the "War on Drugs" policies and their impact on the criminal justice system).
320. Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First
Century: The Evolution ofthe Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REv. 717, 720
(2008).
321. Id at 721.
322. Id ("The U.S. government is now spending upwards of$12.9 billion per year on illicit
drug control, including police protection, the judiciary, corrections, and related costs. In 2003,
alcohol and other drugs were responsible for roughly 628,000 emergency room visits in the
United States. Moreover, the total impact on society of alcohol and other drug use is estimated to
have cost the United States in excess of $180 billion in 2002, a 5.34% increase over the prior
decade. Using U.S. Census data, this figure represents a burden of$642 for every resident of the
country during 2002." (footnotes omitted)).

2010]

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

387

system, it is no surprise that this area has become a focal point for
creating options other than incarceration. 323
Drug courts represent the most significant alternative to the
incarceration problem specifically keyed to the needs of drug abusing
offenders. The drug court is a nonadversarial, therapeutic adjudication
alternative to the traditional criminal justice system. Instead of working
in opposition to one another, the prosecutor, defense, and judge are asked
to collaborate in addressing the specific needs of the offender in
treatment. Typically, there are three paths to the drug court: (1) as a
condition of an agreement for diversion of prosecution, (2) as a condition
to a guilty plea, or (3) as a sentencing deferral for a verdict. Participation
in the drug court treatment programs is not mandatory for drug violation
defendants but is strongly encouraged, and breaking conditions of such
programs usually results in the imposition of significant consequences. 324
Jurisdictions impose a variety of eligibility requirements for drug court
programs, and such treatment programs last a year or more; treatment
services are predominantly outpatient. Two key components that are
characteristic of the more than 2000 U.S. drug courts are (1) the use of
short jail terms for court participants who do not comply with the
requirements of the program, and (2) frequent court appearances before
the same judge to monitor treatment progress.325
The first drug court was established in Florida twenty years ago. 326
The federal government has contributed to the funding of these drug
courts, further encouraging growth. The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations
Act allocated $40 million for funding of drug court programs and $1.25
million for funding of the National Drug Court Institute. 327 Additionally,
legislatures in forty-nine states have supported the growth of drug courts
providing funding and statutory guidelines. 328 With this support, and the
ever pressing need to find a fix for overcrowding in the penitentiary
system, the drug court movement has accelerated rapidly.
The drug court movement has fueled strong support and vehement
opposition on both ideological and practical levels. Supporters argue that
323. For a good overview, see Richburg, supra note 317.
324. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 746. The National Association of Drug Court
Professionals (NADCP) publishes an excellent set of materials describing the process. See
generally Nat'! Drug Court Inst., Publications, http://www.ndci.org/publications (last visited Jan.
7, 2010) (linking to NADCP publications).
325. SeeHora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 762-63.
326. Jd at 766.
327. H.R. 1105, !11th Cong. (2009), avaJlable at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=lll_cong_bills&docid=f:hll05enr.txt.pdf.
328. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 766.
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drug courts are ideologically a more rational, effective, and ethical way to
deal with drug addicted offenders, by providing treatment for the
recognized disease of addiction. 329 On a practical level, supporters claim
that drug courts reduce recidivism, lower costs associated with
incarceration, and address the root problem of substance abuse behind
drug crimes. 330 In terms of repeat offenders, some evidence indicates that
drug court treatment programs successfully lower recidivism rates. 331 The
National Association of Drug Court Professionals is an especially
effective supporter. Its views are striking:
FACT:
FACT:

FACT:

FACT:

FACT:
FACT:
FACT:

Nationwide, for every $1.00 invested in Drug Court, taxpayers
save as much as $3.36 in avoided criminal justice costs alone.
When considering other cost offsets such as savings from
reduced victimization and healthcare service utilization, studies
have shown benefits range up to $12 for every $1 invested.
Drug Courts produce cost savings ranging from $4,000 to
$12,000 per client. Th~se cost savings reflect reduced prison
costs, reduced revolving-door arrests and trials, and reduced
victimization.
In 2007, for every Federal dollar invested in Drug Court, $9.00
was leveraged in state funding.
For methamphetamine-addicted people, Drug Courts increase
treatment program graduation rates by nearly 80%.
When compared to eight other programs, Drug Courts
quadrupled the length of abstinence from methamphetamine.
Drug Courts reduce methamphetamine use by more than 50%
. treatment a1one.332
compared to outpatient

329. See, e.g., id at 745-46.
330. See 1d at 791.
331. Id; see also Douglas B. Marlowe et al., A Sober Assessment ofDrug Courts, 16 FED.
SENT'G REP. 153, !54 (2003) (stating that in surveying fifteen unpublished studies on drug court
statistics, drug court participants were foimd to have lowered rates of criminal recidivism, drug
use, and unemployment than those with prison time, intermediate sanctions, or probation, and
these rates were reduced by 20 to 30% for participants during the program, and I 0 to 20%
following conclusion of treatment).
332. Nat'! Ass'n of Drug Court Policy (NADCP), Drug Courts Work, http://www.nadcp.
org/leam/drug-courts-work (last visited Jan. 7, 2010); see also Nat'! Drug Court Inst., Court
Facts, http://www.ndci.org/courtfacts_benefits.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2010). Other commentators are more restrained:
The not-so-simple fact is that drug courts are neither successful nor unsuccessful.
They "work" for some clients under some circumstances but are ineffective or
contraindicated for others. They can be administered poorly and inefficiently and,
unfortunately, we do not know enough to identifY specific errors in implementation.
If drug courts were required to undergo the same type of approval process as
new medications, they would probably be labeled as "experimental" and might not be
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Despite some documented advantages over incarceration, drug court
opponents question the validity and methods of studies indicating that
drug courts have a statistically significant reduction in recidivism. 333
Even if the reduced recidivism rates are accurate, some critics of drug
courts argue that while treatment of offenders in the program may have
higher rates of success, the programs actually trigger "massive netwidening" by including offenders who would not otherwise be incarcerated. 334 They also attack the courts on rights-based and ideological
grounds. One of the most common criticisms here is that the
collaborative drug court system erodes the adversarial system, impacting
the rights of defendants and weakening the ability of defense counsel to
ethically represent defendants. 335
Other prominent rights-based and ideological attacks of drug courts
are focused on the coercive nature of the court, and the impact of faithbased organizations in treatment of offenders. Opponents of drug courts
contend that offenders are not provided with any real option of accepting
treatment when the only alternative is incarceration. 336 Still, such
critiques have not at all slowed the growth rate of, and enthusiasm for, the
drug court option.

approved for specific uses. This is because we do not yet understand their mechanism
of action, do not know their contraindications, and do not know their appropriate
dosage. On the other hand, to take the analogy a step further, there is ample scientific
support for drug courts to warrant further research on them, and to make them
available to desperate clients who have not responded favorably to currently available
treatments.
Marlowe, supra note 331, at 156. But see ROBERT BARNOSKI & STEVE Aos, WASH. STATE INST.
FOR PuB. POLICY, WASHINGTON STATE'S DRUG COURTS FOR ADULT DEFENDANTS: OUTCOME
EVALUATION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS I (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/
rptfiles/drugcourtMar2003.pdf ("[D]rug courts generate $1.74 in benefits for each dollar of costs.
Thus, adult drug courts appear to be cost-effective ...."). The latest research appears to bear out
many of the pro-court claims. In the Supreme Court of Virginia's Program Evaluation of
Virginia's Drug Treatment Courts, the authors found that the rearrest rate for drug court
participants was significantly lower than for nonparticipants. SUPREME COURT OF VA., PROGRA.!'vl
EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA'S DRUG TREATMENT COURTS 2008 REPORT 43-44 (2009). And, that was
not the only positive result found in the state's twenty-nine drug courts. Other evidence of
progress is shown as to "improved employment, education, and health gains." ld at 2.
333. See Morris B. Hoffinan, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, !4 FED.
SENT'GREP. 172,172 (2001).
334. See id at 174. This complaint is, as we shall see, also heard in Australia.
335. Id at 175; see also Tamar M. Meekins, "Specialized Justice':· The Over-Emergence
ofSpecialty Courts and the Threat ofa New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
I, 3 (2006); Quinn, supra note 319, at 74.
336. Hora & Stalcup, supra note 320, at 750.
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Other Alternative Courts

Additional therapeutic jurisprudence specialty courts are spreading
around the United States, following the drug court framework. Over
2500 such problem-solving courts, in more than a dozen different
substantive areas, can be found across the nation. 337 These include:
mental health courts,338 domestic violence courts,339 community courts,340
homeless courts, 341 criminal mediation projects, 342 prisoner reentry
courts, 343 veteran's criminal courts, 344 DUI/DWI courts, 345 and college
student restorative justice courts. 346
Some in the United States also argue forcefully for alternatives that
look to different sorts of punishment, such as shaming. 347 While, as we
shall see, the Australians have been somewhat more willing to look to
other approaches, the Americans have seemingly united-at least at this
time-mainly on the drug court option as discussed above.

337. John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modification: Understanding the Nature and
Limitations of Problem-Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L.J. 97, 98 (2007) (citing C. West
Huddleston III et al., Painting the Current Picture: A National RepoJt Card on Drug Courts and
Other Problem Solving Court Programs in the United States, NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REv., May
2005, at 10-14). For a good overview of such courts, see PAUL HIGGINS & MICHELL B.
MACKINEM, PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? (2009).
338. See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Ofli:nders, 28 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 255 (2001); Andrea M. Odegaard, Note, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Impact of
Mental Health Courts on the Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L. REv. 225, 245 (2007); Susan
Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L.
507 (2005).
339. See Julia Weber, Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations, 2 J.
CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTs. 23, 23-24 (2000).
340. See Meekins, supra note 335, at 24.
341. Id at 26. First created in San Diego, California, in 1989, the homeless court was
formed as a means of clearing warrants existing for homeless people already involved in shelter
treatment programs. Jd Program advocates broker plea agreements in exchange for the accused
being sentenced to continue the treatment program. Id
342. Birgit Larsson, Mediation in Criminal Matters Project Flourishes in Kings County,
New JVrk; A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWSL. (A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section, Wash., D.C.),
Spring 2009, at 4.
343. Jd
344. See Nicholas Riccardi, Courts Give l*lyw.ud Veterans a Chance, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/Mar/1 0/nation/na_veterans_courtl 0.
345. Victor E. Flango, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, DWI Courts: The Newest ProblemSolving Courts, in FlffURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 84, 84 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2004),
availableathttp://www.ncsconline.org!WC/Publications!KIS_CtFutu_Trends04.pdf.
346. See Sara Lipka, With 'Restorative Justice,' Colleges Strive To Educate Student
Ofli:nders, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Apr. 17, 2009, at A26, available athttp://chronicle.com/article/
With-Restorative-Justice-130551.
347. Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments BeautifUlly Retnbutive? Retributivism and
Implications for the Altemative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2157, 2162-63 (200 1).
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Heavily influenced by innovations in sentencing practices in the
United States, Australian courts have also been involved in a wave of
experimentation over the last ten years as incarceration rates and
expenses have increased along with community expectations for a more
responsive and cost-effective criminal justice system. As in the United
States, specialty courts have developed with the aim of diverting
offenders from jail and delivering more therapeutic or restorative justice
that is oriented to resolving the problems underlying criminal behavior.
In Australia, however, it is not only the drug court that has gained
widespread approval.
2.

Australian Drug Courts

As noted earlier, drug courts in the United States have arisen as a
reaction to the severity of the war on drugs. Australian drug courts, in
contrast, emerged unaccompanied by harsh mandatory minimum
sentences for drug possession and use. Nonetheless, the impetus for the
establishment of drug courts in Australia was similar, driven by
community concern over increasing rates of property and violent crime
and their perceived link with drug trafficking and drug use. 348 However,
unlike the United States, where the legislature's response to community
apprehension was to impose draconian penalties, the Australian response
reflected the realization that imprisonment was an ineffective instrument
to address drug related offending. 349 Drug courts appealed because they
adopted a therapeutic approach to the problem of drug dependency,
required offenders to take personal responsibility for their offending and
rehabilitation, and appeared to reduce drug related crime at a much lower
cost than imprisonmeneso
348. Joy WUNDERSITZ, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES TO
DRUG AND DRUG-RELATED OFFENDING: ARE THEY WORKING? 2 (2007).
349. See David Indermaur & Lynne Roberts, Drug Courts in Australia: The First
Generation, 15 CURRENT IssuEs IN CRIM. JusT. 136, 137 (2003) [hereinafter Indermaur &
Roberts, Drog Court5]; Lynne Roberts & David Indermaur, Timely Intervention or Trapping
Minnows? The Potential fiJr a Range of Net- WJdening Efkcts in Australian Drug Diversion
Initiatives, 13 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 220, 220 (2006) [hereinafter Roberts & Indermaur,
Timely Intervention].
350. Indermaur & Roberts, Drog Court5, supra note 349, at 137; see also Melissa Bull, A
Comparative Review ofBest Practice Guidelines for the Diversion ofDrog Related 0/knders, 16
INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 223, 223 (2005); Frances O'Callaghan et a!., Drog and Crime Cycle:
Evaluating Traditional Methods ~rsus Diversion Strategies /Or Drug-Related 0/knces, 39
AUSTL. PSYCHOLOGIST 188, 190-91 (2004).
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Whereas drug courts in the United States were developed
principally at the grass roots level, in Australia a nationally coordinated
approach was adopted, underpinned by significant fiscal support.
Between 1999 and 2008, the federal government devoted AUS$340
million to drug diversion programs supplemented by substantial statebased funding of drug courts. 351 The injection of funding, together with
the development of a national framework known as the Illicit Drug
Diversion Initiative (IDDI), agreed to by all Australian state governments,
facilitated the rapid rollout of a range of drug diversion programs across
Australian jurisdictions.352 Although Australian drug courts were also
largely local initiatives, they sit within and receive considerable support
from the national strategy. They operate across the criminal process and
health services spectrum at the prearrest, postarrest, presentencing,
postsentencing, and prerelease stages involving police, corrections
workers, government departments, government service providers, health
practitioners, and social workers working in conjunction with the
judiciary.353 New South Wales established the first drug court in 1999,354
and by 2006 there were thirty-two IDDI-funded diversion police and
court programs, operating in each Australian state and territory. 355 There
are also approximately twenty-one non-IDDI funded programs. 356
In a number of jurisdictions, the practices of the drug courts are
codified by legislation. This is in contrast with the United States, where
practices of drug courts are generally unconstrained by regulation. For
example, the Drug Court Act, 1998 (N.S.W), determines the eligibility
of offenders for diversion to the drug court; empowers the court to
commit the offender to a period of detention for the purpose of
detoxification, assessment, and treatment; gives the court authority to
impose compulsory treatment orders and other conditions of
participation in the program; lays down procedures for noncompliance;

351. Wundersitz, supra note 348, at 2.
352. Bull, supra note 350, at 223.
353. Catherine Spooner eta!., An Overview ofDiversion Strategies for Australian DrugRelated Offenders, 20 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 281, 281-82 (200 1).
354. Ruth Lawrence & Karen Freeman, Design and Implementation of Australia's First
Drug Court, 35 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 63, 63 (2002).
355. AUSTL. INST. OF HEALTH & WELFARE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ILLICIT DRUG
DIVERSION INITIATIVE IN RURAL AND REMOTE AUSTRALIA 44 (2008), available at http://www.aihw.
gov.au/publications/index.cfin/title/1 0496.
356. CAITLIN HUGHES & ALLISON RITTER, AUSTL. NAT'L DRUG & ALCOHOL RESEARCH
CTR., A SUMMARY OF DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR DRUG AND DRUG-RELATED OFFENDERS IN
AUSTRALIA II (2008), available at http://www.dpmp.unsw.edu.au/DPMPWeb.nsflresources/Mono
graph+ 16.pdf7$file/Mono+ 16.pdf.
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and also regulates the Drug Court's procedure. 357 Other similar statebased legislation includes: (1) Drug Rehabilitation (Court Diversion)
Act, 2000 (Queensl.); (2) Sentencing Act, 1991, sections 18Q-18ZS
(Viet.); (3) Sentencing Act, 1995, sections 33A-33Q (W Austl.); and
(4) Sentencing Act, 1997, sections 27A-27Y (Tas.). The legislation in
each jurisdiction operates to target defendants with substance abuse
problems who are brought before the courts on a wide range of matters.
It then diverts them to a specialized court or requires the offenders to
undertake a form of coerced treatment for their substance abuse problem
over a substantial period of time (on average about three to four months'
duration), subject to ongoing monitoring and review. 358 The majority of
the programs operate at the pre-sentence stage, although the Queensland
legislation also refers to postsentence options.359 Defendants charged
with sex offences or offences of serious violence are excluded from the
drug diversion programs. 360 If the defendants successfully complete the
program it may lead to the withdrawal of charges against them, but
typically program participation results in a reduced sentence. 361
There is some concern that Australia's formalization of drug
diversion may counterintuitively widen the net of individuals subject to
the criminal justice process. 362 While previously lower-level offending,
such as the possession of small amounts of drugs, may have attracted
little or no intervention, once an intervention program is formalized it has
been suggested that a greater number of individuals will therefore be
corralled into the criminal justice system. 363 For example, South
Australia introduced expiation notices for cannabis possession instead of
criminal prosecution, which could result in a potential sentence of
irnprisonmene64 Expiation notices then increased three-fold, as did the
number of individuals with a criminal conviction for possession of
cannabis because the police found the expiation notices easier to
administer. 365 Once caught by the criminal justice system, individuals
charged with drug offences may have a strong incentive to plead guilty to
357. SeeDrugCourtAct, 1998(N.S.W).
358. Katie Willis & Jennifer Ahmad, Jntennediate Court-Based Diversion in Australia,
CRJM. JusT. BULL., Apr. 2009, at 1, 4, available at http://ncpic.org.au/assets/downloads/ncpic/
publications/aic_bulletins/intermediate-court-based-diversion-in-australia.pdf.
359. Jd
360. Jd at3.
361. Jd at4.
362. See Roberts & Indermaur, Timely Intervention, supra note 349, at 220; O'Callaghan
eta!., supra note 350, at 192.
363. SeeO'Callaghan eta!., supra note 350, at 192.
364. Roberts & Indermaur, Timely Intervention, supra note 349, at 226.
365. Jd
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qualify for the diversion program and therefore avoid the possibility of a
long term of imprisonment. As a result, the programs may attract
infrequent drug users instead of the seriously addicted that the programs
were intended to assist, although evidence that Australian drug courts are
clogged with recreational drug users is scant.
There have been a series of evaluations undertaken of Australian
drug court regimes, 366 but many are compromised because of a lack of
comparison groups, small sample sizes, and short term follow up. As a
result of high attrition rates, all suffer from reporting bias. Bearing these
caveats in mind, the research has found that the diversion programs
reduce drug use and criminal behavior and improve offenders' health and
well-being. In terms of costs incurred, drug courts are not necessarily
cheaper than conventional criminal justice processes, especially where
participation in the diversion program requires the offender to undergo
custodial assessment and treatmenC 67 However, when reoffending is
factored in, drug courts are much more cost-effective than incarceration.368 A study conducted by the Western Australia Attorney General's
department has estimated cost savings of$67,345 per drug court clienC69
Notwithstanding the demonstrated benefits of a nationally
coordinated and well funded strategy, there is evidence that barriers to
access have undermined the program's success, particularly among
indigenous Australians. Although the Australian government has
committed itself to closing the gap between indigenous and nonindige370
nous Australians, on all social and economic indicators, indigenous
Australians are severely disadvantaged. 371 As noted earlier in this Article,
incarceration rates are approximately thirteen times higher in the
indigenous population. At the same time, substance abuse among
indigenous offenders is alarmingly high. Over 68% of indigenous
detainees in police custody test positive to a range of drugs, and there are
366. Most of these are summarized in Wundersitz, supra note 348, at 2. See also HUGHES
& RIITER, supra note 356, at 2; Don Weatherburn et a!., The NSW Drug Court: A Re-Evaluation
ofIts Effectiveness, CONTEMP. IssUES IN CRIME & JUST., Sept. 2008, at 1, 4; Marian Shanahan et

a!., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the New South Wales Adult Drug Court Program, 28
EVALUATION REv. 3, 4 (2004).
367. Wundersitz, supra note 348, at 110.
368. Jd
369. DEP'T OF THE ATI'Y GEN., Gov'T OF W. AUSTL., A REVIEW OF THE PERTH DRUG COURT
32 (2006), available at http://www.courts.dotag. wa.gov.aul=files/Drug_court_review_2006.pdf.
370. See Soc. Inclusion, Closing the Gap for Indigenous Australians, http://www.social
inclusion.gov.au/Initiatives/Pages/closingthegap.aspx (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
371. STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF Gov'T SERV. PROVISION, PRODUCfiVITY
COMM'N, OVERCOMING INDIGENOUS DISADVANTAGE: KEY INDICATORS 2009, available at http://
www.pc.gov.aul_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/90 129/key-indicators-2009.pdf (last visited Mar. 27,
201 0) (hereinafter STEERING COMM. ].
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indications that alcohol abuse is associated with up to 90% of indigenous
contacts with the criminal justice system. 372 Many indigenous offenders
also suffer from a coexisting mental illness.373 Diversion of indigenous
offenders with substance abuse problems to assessment, education, and
treatment would clearly be of great benefit to the offenders, their families,
and their communities. Unfortunately, the IDDI framework excludes
offenders who commit violent offences or those whose primary drug
374
problem is an alcohol problem. The requirement that the offenders
admit their guilt also operates as a barrier, since many indigenous people
are reluctant to engage with the police or the criminal justice system. 375
Insofar as the indigenous population is concerned, obviously current
sentencing policy and practice is failing. Eligibility criteria need to be
changed, tailored indigenous health services need to be incorporated into
the drug diversion programs, and the treatments they offer need to be
made more inclusive of indigenous communities and indigenous
376
culture.
3.

Indigenous Courts

The establishment of indigenous sentencing courts in some
Australian jurisdictions has been another method to address overrepresentation of indigenous offenders in the criminal justice system. 377
Consistent with the philosophy of equality before the law, the indigenous
courts apply the same sentencing principles to indigenous persons that
would apply to nonindigenous persons. 378 However, the indigenous
courts adopt procedures that aim to make criminal justice processes more
culturally appropriate, to establish better communication and trust
between the indigenous community and the judiciary, and to facilitate
better understanding of offenders' life stories and situations through a
process of exchange informed by senior members of the indigenous
372. NAT'L INDIGENOUS DRUG & ALcOHOL COMM., AUSTL. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DRUGS,
BRIDGES AND BARRIERS: ADDRESSING INDIGENOUS INCARCERATION AND HEALTH 5-6 (2008),
http://www.nidac.org.au/publications/pdf/nidac_bridges_and_barriers.pdf.
373. Id at 7.
374. Id at 11.
375. Id at 7.
376. Seeidatll-12.
377. MiCHAEL KING ET AL., NON-AoVERSARIAL JUSTICE 178 (2009); EDNEY & BAGARIC,
supra note 283, at 8.10; Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Courts and Justice
Practices in Australia, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME & CR!M. JUST., May 2004, at 1, 1; Elena
Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Sentencing Courts: Towards a Theoretical and
Jurisprudential Model, 29 SYDNEY L. REv. 415, 422 (2007) [hereinafter Marchetti & Daly,
Indigenous Sentencing Cowt].
378. Marchetti & Daly, Indigenous Sentencing Court, supra note 377, at 420.
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community. 379 While the courts incorporate elements of therapeutic and
restorative justice, they have been characterized as sui generis because
their hallmark is involvement of the local indigenous community. 380
The first indigenous court was established at Port Adelaide in South
Australia in 1999.381 There are now indigenous courts operating in each
Australian jurisdiction except Tasmania. 382 Some are governed by
specific legislation or regulation, for example, Criminal Procedure
Regulation, Part 5 (N.S.W); Penalties and Sentences Act, 1992, § 195B
(Queensl.); and Magistrates' Court (Koori Court) Act, 2002 (Viet.), while
others have developed indigenous sentencing practices within existing
sentencing law. 383
Like the drug courts, evaluation of Australian indigenous courts is
generally positive. 384 Indigenous courts have assisted offenders to .take
more responsibility for their offending and increased their awareness of
the impact of their offending on victims and among the community.
Unfortunately, however, because of the collaborative nature of the
processes adopted by indigenous courts, like the IDDI framework,
eligibility criteria exclude violent and sexual offenders, and so access to
more culturally appropriate treatment is limited for many indigenous
offenders.
Consequently, the impact of indigenous courts upon
reoffending has been mixed, with one study finding that direct
involvement of the indigenous community in sentencing made no
difference to indigenous recidivism absent other interventions such as
drug treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, or remedial education. 385
VI.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Our initial thesis is that the divergence between the criminal justice
systems of the United States and Australia can be explained as a
difference between a rights-oriented culture and an official-centric
culture. This notion can be easily applied to double jeopardy, as
protection from double jeopardy clearly sits under the mantle of due
379. Id
380. Id
381. Id at 417-18 tbl.l.
382. Id
383. Id
384. Bridget McAsey, A Cntical Evaluation of the Koori Court Division of the Victorian
Magistrates' Court, 10 DEAKIN L. REv. 654, 657 (2005); see also Ivan Potas et a!., Circle
Sentencing in New South Wales: A Review and Evaluation, 8 AUSTL.lNDIGENOUS L. REP. 73, 80
(2004); NATALIE PARKER & MARK PATHE, QUEENSL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & Arr'Y GEN., REPORT ON
THE REVIEW OF THE MURRI COURT 4 (2006).
385. Jacqueline Fitzgerald, Does Circle Sentencing Reduce Aboriginal Ofknding?,
CONTEMP. ISSUES JNCR.!ME&JUST., May 2008, at 1, 6-7.
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process386 and, at an international level, comprises a long-established and
commonly recognized civil righe 87 In the United States, where the
protection of the individual from an overbearing government is
embedded within both popular and legal culture, protection from double
jeopardy is an inviolable right that cannot be qualified or negated by
legislation or government action. 388 Conversely, while at common law the
Australian High Court has extended double jeopardy beyond the ancient
doctrines of autrefois acquit! convict to embrace the broader concept of
389
abuse of process, this development has been effectively negated. We
refer here to a number of Australian state jurisdictions implementing
laws that allow the retrial of acquittals or the trial of further offences that
call earlier acquittals into doubt when fresh and compelling evidence of
guilt is adduced. These laws were enacted largely because Australians do
not believe that rights should trump the conviction and punishment of the
guilty.390
When applied to divergences between plea bargaining practice and,
more importantly, completely distinct approaches to sentencing, our
thesis requires further refinement. As noted above, charge bargaining in
Australia is more limited than the plea bargaining that occurs in the
United States.
Although it occurs frequently, Australian charge
bargaining is confined to negotiations over the number and seriousness
of charges that will be prosecuted, and under nationally uniform
guidelines that attempt to reflect the actual nature and extent of the
defendant's criminality. Australian sentencing judges do not participate
in, and are not bound by, agreements reached between defense counsel
and prosecutors regarding any recommended sentence. 391 Given the
comparatively limited nature of charge bargaining in Australia, it is
therefore surprising that the major policy concern is the fear that
negotiations between prosecution and defense will lead to unjustified
horse trading, thus undermining the rule of law. 392 State-based Australian
legislative attempts to rein in charge bargaining are not initiated to
386. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
387. SeeThe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 14, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
388. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I (1978).
389. SeeThe Queen v. Carroll [2002] H.C.A. 55, paras. 32-33.
390. David Hamer, The Expectation ofIncorrect Acquittals and the "New and Compelling
EVIdence" Exception to Double Jeopardy, 2 CRIM. L. REv. 63, 63 (2009).
391. See, e.g., R v. Pugh (2005) !58 A. Crirn. R. 302, 339-45; R v. Marshall [1981] V.R.
725.
392. See supra text accompanying note 76; see also Asher Flynn, Carl Williams: Secret
Deals and Bargained Justice-The Underworld of Victorias Plea Bargaining System, 19
CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 120, 120 (2007).
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protect the rights of defendants. They are largely designed to ensure that
defendants receive their just desserts. 393
In the United States, where plea bargaining is less constrained, the
concern is different. Here, critics look to the coercive impact that an
offer made by an overzealous prosecutor may have upon hapless
defendants otherwise faced with an extraordinarily harsh sentence. 394 The
unease regarding coercive plea bargaining in the United States is closely
allied to high levels of punitiveness within U.S. mandatory sentencing
frameworks. One of the observed collateral effects of adopting tough
mandatory sentencing regimes in the United States has been a significant
increase in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to whether
mandatory-sentencing-eligible charges will be pursued. 395
As we discussed above, in Australia, the community is playing a
greater role in sentencing and, as a result, sentences are becoming more
punitive. Still, sentencing remains largely within the province of the trial
judge's discretion, allowing individualized mercy to be exercised where
appropriate. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Australian judges are highly
insulated from the consequences of sentencing decisions. Australian
judges are appointed until retirement age, and cannot be removed except
by way of an onerous parliamentary process. 396 Typically, gross moral
turpitude rather than unpopular decision making must be established to
force an Australian judge from the bench. 397 By contrast, at the lower and
intermediate levels of the state judiciary, where most sentencing occurs
in the United States, many judges are compelled to seek re-election to
remain in office. 398 Studies confirm that sentences increase as judicial
election/reelection nears, in response to the tendency of voters in U.S.

393. SeeMiralis, supra note 87.
394. See generally Richard Klein, Due Process Denied· Judicial Coercion in the Plea
Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1349 (2004); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargain Re!Onn, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005); Douglas A.
Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 949 (1986).
395. See Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition ofMandatory
Minimum Sentences, 44 J. REs. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 427-28 (2007). One study in Arizona
has found that as a result of prosecutors' charging decisions, only 10% of eligible offenders
actually receive the applicable mandatory minimum sentence, while at the federal level only 35 to
40% of eligible offenders receive the relevant mandatory sentence. JENNIFER E. WALSH, THREE
STRIKES LAWS 62 (2007).
396. See Australia Constitution Act, 2003, § 72(ii); see also ENID CAMPBELL & H.P. LEE,
THE AUSTRALIAN JUDICIARY Ill (200 1).
397. CAMPBELL& LEE, supra note 396, at Ill.
398. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice
Blind When It Runs !Or Office?, 48 AM.J. POL SCI. 247,247 (2004).
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judicial electorates to be more mindful of instances of underpunishment
than overly harsh sentencing. 399
As a result of mandatory sentencing regimes and sentencing
guidelines, U.S. judges are less able to incorporate individualized mercy
in their sentencing. These regimes were designed to ensure consistency
in sentencing and thus supported the principle of equality before the
law.400 In a second wave of reform during the 1980s and 1990s, along
with the enactment of such measures as "three-strikes laws," the regimes
became a vehicle to increase the use of imprisonment and the severity of
prison sentences.401
The retention of judicial discretion in Australian sentencing and the
concomitant disparity in sentencing that it produces has been criticized
for undermining equality before the law. 402 Nevertheless, limited
attempts to introduce mandatory sentencing have had to be withdrawn
following community outcry over its harsh and discriminatory impact.403
While the Australian public, like the U.S. public, believes that sentences
are generally too lenient, they perceive mandatory sentencing as unjust 04
and contrary to the realization that criminal behavior is often associated
with victimization of the offender, 405 disability, 406 or significant
disadvantage. 407 The retention of judicial discretion enables the
sentencing judge to take account of the offender's personal situation and
the circumstances of the offending, encourages guilty pleas to
appropriate charges, and enables a creative and customized sentence
more likely to incorporate therapeutic or restorative elements.

399. Jd at 258.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 206-208.
401. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 9 (200 I).
402. See, e.g., EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 283.
403. AINSLIE LAMB & JOHN LITTRICH, LAWYERS IN AUSTRALIA 145 (2007); see supra text
accompanying notes 306-311.
404. See Mark A. Nolan & Penelope J. Oakes, Human J?jghts Concepts in Australian
Political Debate, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 75, 83 (Tom
Campbell eta!. eds., 2003); see also Roberts, supra note 306, at 495.
405. See, e.g., David Weisbrot, Homicide Law Refonn in New South Wales, 6 CRIM. L.J.
248 (1982) (linking the abandonment of mandatory life sentences for murder in New South
Wales with public concern over the punishment of victims of domestic abuse who killed their
violent partners).
406. See, e.g., Clyde A. Wmters, Learning Disabilities, Crime, Delinquency, and Special
Education Placement, 32 ADoLESCENCE 451 (1997); J.S. Kreutzer et a!., Interrelationships
Between Crime, Substance Abuse, and Aggressive Behaviours Among Persons with Traumatic
Brain Injury, 9 BRAIN INJURY 757 (1995).
407. See, e.g., Jeffrey Draine eta!., Role ofSocial Disadvantage in Crime, Joblessness, and
Homelessness Among Persons with Senous Mental Illness, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 565 (2002).
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The popularity of noncustodial forms of sentencing in Australia also
demonstrates the realization that overdependence on custodial sentencing
is not cost-effective. On the whole, Australian legislatures and governments are of the view that high levels of imprisonment lead to
unnecessary public expenditure through increased trial rates and longer
408
case processing, and also place a significant financial strain on limited
state budgets. Moreover, despite public "tough on crime" rhetoric as in
the United States, they are also aware that harsh sentencing has a
negligible impact on crime rates. 409 American policy makers are
increasingly beginning to share these views as the cost and social impact
of high levels of incarceration demonstrate that harsh mandatory
sentencing regimes may not be sustainable, especially in tough economic
times.
The greater degree of prosecutorial discretion and the imposition of
mandatory minimum sentences in the United States may reflect distrust
and disempowerment of the judiciary.410 To that extent, the differences
between the features of each criminal justice regime examined in this
Article are consistent with the thesis that the Australian criminal justice
system is more official-centric. By retaining their faith in the judiciary
as best placed to exercise sentencing power (albeit while demanding
greater participation in the sentencing process), Australians continue to
exhibit the confidence in state-based institutions that we outlined in our
earlier article.
This does not involve eschewing rights-based
jurisprudence focused upon the protection of the individual from an
overbearing state. Still, it exhibits a continued belief in the need to
preserve an independent judiciary free from executive constraint and
4
shielded from populism. '' By contrast, the limits placed on judicial
sentencing discretion in the United States appears to reflect a penal
policy aimed at capturing common public opinion and prioritizing it in
sentence determination. 412
However, the thesis should not be strained too far. There are other
differentiating sociological and political factors in each jurisdiction that
408. Cf.TONRY, supra note 261, at 160.
409. AUSTL. SENATE LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., INQUIRY INfO THE
HUMAN RIGHTS (MANDATORY SENTENCING OF PROPERTY OFFENCES) BILL 298 (2000), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/200204/hra_mandsent/index.htm.
410. See Huber & Gordon, supra note 398, at 247; cf.Gar1and, supra note 401.
411. See Peter Sa1lmann, Mandatory Sentencing: A Birds Eye Wew, 14 J. Juo. ADMIN.
177, 183 (2005).
412. See Ka~a Franco Aas, The Ad and the Fonn: Punitiveness and Technological
Culture, in THE NEW PuNrrivENESS: TREND, THEORIES, PERSPECTNES 150, 151-53 (John Pratt et
al. eds., 2005).
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also help explain the strong divergence in sentencing outcomes and, in
particular, between rates of incarceration. U.S. and Australian literature
on public attitudes to sentencing is remarkably similar, confirming that
U.S. citizens are probably no more punitive in their attitudes than
Australians. 413 Although communities in each jurisdiction want offenders
to receive appropriate punishment, they also want to see them
rehabilitated and are happy for state budgets to be expended upon
noncustodial programs as long as public safety is not compromised.
Nonetheless, arguably there is a greater fear of perceived pathological
and dangerous criminality in the United States, which has elevated the
protection of public safety to a more dominant position in penal policy
414
than is apparent in Australia.
In this Article, we have examined important aspects of the criminal
justice systems in our nations apart from what we looked at in our earlier
work. Once again, we continue to be struck by how the two nations
approach problems from sharply different perspectives. We conclude, as
in the earlier piece, that much-though not all--of that difference is
traceable to the sense that Australian jurisprudence is official-centric
while U.S. jurisprudence is rights-oriented.

413. SeeGELB,MORE MYTIIS, supra note 263, at 1; Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes
About Punishment: Myth and Reality, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OvERCROWDED TIMES: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 250 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997).
414. Lolc Wacquant, The Great Penal Leap Backward: Incarceration in America !Tom
Nixon to Clinton, in THE NEW PuNITivENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 412,
at 3, 11.

